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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Foreign direct investment is the primary engine of economic
development. The factors influencing a country's governmental policy
of foreign direct investment at an international level constitute a
wide and complex subject. This subject in my country--Taiwan,
Republic of China, has been receiving increasing attention, for we now
face the problems of balance of payments deficits, how to strengthen
the N.T. dollar and improving the functions of foreign direct
investment etc. There is a regulation "Regulations Governing the
Screening and Disposal of Outward Investment and Outward Technical
Cooperation Projects" which was promulgated by the Executive Yuan of
Republic of China on January 3, 1980, and simply provides some
controls of foreign direct investment. In order to cope with the
problems mentioned above, we are discussing how to revise the
"Regulations Governing the Screening and Disposal of Outward
Investment and Outward Technical Cooperation Projects" or remove it
now. We know whether the foreign direct investment should be
controlled depends upon the diversity of situations which every
country has. But, in early 1970, the United States also had similar
problems which my country faces now, therefore, I will examine the
"Foreign Direct Investment Regulations" (FDIR) of U.S. enacted in 1968
to evaluate how the United States coped with the problems now facing
2my country. I will analyze circumstances under which the United
States implemented and revoked the FDIR as well as review the FDIR's
contents and effects.
1.1 Background and Motive of the United States Foreign Investment
According to H. Peter Gray (1), the U.S. historical development
of foreign investment is marked by three stages. Prior to World War
I, most international investment was of the portfolio type. By 1914,
U.S. foreign direct investment amounted to only $2.65 billion.
Generally, direct investment activity was of the type going from
colonial powers to their possessions. The second period, the
inter-war years, was characterized by little direct investment. The
U.S. undertook some investment activity abroad following World War I
especially in the automotive industry. American direct investment in
1929 totalled $7.2 billion with 1,057 foreign subsidiaries (446 in
Canada alone) but the international economy was rocked by the
depression so little incentive existed for undertaking foreign direct
investment. Instead, most businesses were engaged in activity geared
toward increasing domestic production and employment. The third
period, post World War II, is the stage during which foreign direct
investment emerges as the most significant form of long term business
activity.
Following World War II, the United States was in a superior
position with respect to technological progress and economic
productivity. In order to stimulate post-war international economic
recovery the Truman and Eisenhower administrations provided
3inducements for American firms to go abroad. Foreign aid from the
u.s. under Eisenhower came in the form of private investment as it
benefitted not only the international economy but the American economy
as well. Other factors accounted for the expansion of U.S. foreign
direct investment in the years following World War II including: (a)
tariffs, quotas and currency controls which limited foreign markets
for American produced goods; (b) reduced transportation rates on
locally-produced goods and lower productions costs; (c) excess
capacity in durable goods industries which led American firms to look
to foreign markets for investment opportunities; (d) expectation of
higher profits from manufacturing in countries with fast-growing
economies; and (e) lower corporate income taxes and attractive
depreciation allowances in certain countries (2).
Although statements are often made to the effect that the United
States is not foreign investment minded, today the United States is
the leading capital export nation of the world. The United States has
made available to foreign countries billions of dollars in public and
private investment for economic development (3). The rate of foreign
investment has been higher since World War II, but from the end of
World War I, United States capital has played an important role in the
development of foreign resources and industries. New direct United
States investments abroad rose in 1947 to a level which has since then
been maintained with only minor fluctuations. Outstanding portfolio
investments abroad declined in 1946 but have since risen, particularly
because of large purchases of Canadian securities since 1950.
Aggregate exports of private long-term capital have therefore shown a
4tendency to increase during the period. The first series shown for
the United Kingdom reflects the relative ease of the capital market
during 1947-1949, following the receipt of the United States loan in
1946 (4). It seems probable, however, that the outflow of private
capital at the time largely represented short-term funds; the trend of
long-term capital exports may be more accurately reflected in the
capital issues for overseas account which have tended to rise over the
entire period considered.
United States private capital invested abroad at the end of 1952
amounted to about $21 billion, of which $14.5 billion represented
direct investments, computed at book value, and $6.5 billion,
portfolio investments at their market value. During the seven years
1946-1952, the recorded gross outflow of private investment capital
was $9.2 billion, of which sum direct investment accounted for $8.2
billion and portfolio investment for $1 billion. These figures
reflect the drastic change in the capital market since the decade
following World War I, when portfolio and direct investments appear to
have been expanding at approximately the same rate. In the mid-1920's
capital exports resulting from the flotation of new capital issued in
the United States--chiefly in the form of dollar bonds of foreign
governments, though also including some corporate issues which counted
as direct investment--amounted to about $1 billion annually. Most
United States investment in foreign countries since 1930 has been in
the form of direct investment (5).
It is usual to classify the motives for foreign direct investment
into nature resource-oriented, market-oriented and factor-oriented
5investment (6). Natural resource-oriented investment is obviously
trade-oriented or trade-generating, for it results from the investing
country's desire to increase imports of its comparatively
disadvantageously produced or domestically unavailable commodities,
and causes growth in vertical specialization between producers of
manufactures and primary products. There is the problem that
integrated production and marketing are monopolised or oligopolised by
big multinationals in oil, copper and other resource goods, leaving
smaller benefits to those countries endowed with natural resources.
Market-oriented investment can be subdivided into two categories.
Foreign direct investment induced by trade barriers in the host
country is trade-oriented but in a different way from the
trade-oriented investment. In this situation, heavier tariffs on
final products, for example, lead to the substitution of exports of
final products for the export of parts and components, intermediate
materials, machinery, equipment and technology necessary to the
production of final goods from the investing country. This type of
foreign direct investment meets the recipient country's interest in
promoting import-substituting activity, not necessary intended to be
competitive in the international market, and therefore results in some
waste of resources because of the degree of protection provided to the
final goods production. But, if the import-substitution industry
grows successfully towards export orientation, then foreign direct
investment of this type turns out to be factor-oriented investment.
Factor-oriented investment is also trade-oriented. As wages in the
advanced investing country become higher year by year relative to
6capital and as new products--usually more capital- and
knowledge-intensive than traditional goods--are created 0ne after
another, it becomes profitable and rational for the advanced country
to contract its own traditional, labor-intensive industries and
transfer the location of production to low-wage countries where
cheaper labor costs prevail. Thus, corresponding to a dynamic change
in comparative advantage, such foreign investment assists the
reorganization of the international division of labor and promotes the
growth of trade between labor-scarce and labor-abundant countries. It
should be noted that the factor-oriented investment is aimed at
establishing an export base, rather than import substitution, and the
development of exports to the investing country as well as third
markets (7).
Furthermore, the decision to invest abroad depends on an
enterprise's strategy. The selection of a suitable strategy which
determines the enterprise's growth and change begins in identifying
the opportunities and risks. The environmental influences which are
relevant to strategic decisions are essentially technological,
economic, social and, not least, also political in kind. In all these
categories change is taking place at varying rates--probably fastest
in technology, less rapidly, but still at considerable speed, in
politics (8). Such continuous change in the environment of business
necessitates permanent surveillance and monitoring of an enterprise's
activities. The decision to invest abroad requires therefore a
thorough understanding of the foreign environment. A full
investigation and analysis of the economic, social and political
7situation is necessary before setting up a subsidiary, entering a
market with a certain product, establishing links with local capital,
hiring local staff and managerial resources and negotiating with
national governments or labor representatives. Therefore, the
enterprise's strategy is also a motive of United States foreign
investment.
1.2 Meaning of "Foreign Direct Investment"
Foreign direct investment is an acquisition, expansion, or
establishment of an existing business operation or construction of new
enterprises abroad. It was characterized by at least 25% equity or
managerial control over a business concern in a foreign country. One
leading U.S. corporate executive described direct investments in the
following terms:
'Direct investments are investments in plants to make
things, and in warehouses, sales offices and people. This
is what direct investments are. They are businesses.' (9)
Any investment and lending which satisfied anyone of the
following conditions is classified as overseas direct investment: (a)
the dispatch of executives; (b) the supply of manufacturing
techniques; (c) the supply of raw materials and inputs; (d) the
purchase of products from the invested firm; (e) financial aid; (f)
the conclusion of the contract as general sales agent; and (g) the
establishment of permanent economic relations with firms abroad (10).
Generally, a foreign direct investment is an investment in a
foreign country where the investing party (corporation, firm) retains
8control over the investment. A direct investment typically takes the
form of a foreign firm starting a subsidiary or taking ~ver control of
an existing firm in the country in question. The OECD Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements defines direct investment as
"investment for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations
with an undertaking such as, in particular, investments which give the
possibility of exercising an effective influence on the management
thereof" (11). The definition thus centers upon the concept of
control and leaves to governments--who have varying criteria in this
regard--to decide what level of foreign participation in the capital
of an enterprise constitutes a direct rather than a portfolio
investment. It should be made clear, on the other hand, that the
concept of control is not sufficient to fully understand the
phenomenon of direct investment: in many cases it is indeed not so
much a movement of capital involved in direct investment as an
international movement of technique or organization. Capital is, most
of the time, only the complementary factor of production in a direct
investment.
A primary objective of foreign direct investment is to continue
attempts to extend free trade allover the world. Free trade means
that each country, on the premise that neither labor force nor capital
is transferred internationally, promoted international divisions of
labor along the line of comparative costs. That is to say, the
principle of trade tells us how each country can develop in the
international economy. Foreign direct investment should then
complement the lack of capital or management skills of the host
9country. The cheap production which was not possible previously
because of the lack of these elements is then possible. So, based on
the new comparative costs, harmonious trade can grow. The role of
direct investment, as it promotes the structural adjustment, is to
establish this harmonious trade (12).
It is a salient feature of foreign direct investment that the
investor wants to retain control over his investment. Control,
however, is a legal concept, not too useful for economic analysis. It
might therefore be better to say that one of the main determinants of
direct investment has to do with technological superiority or superior
managerial skills, i.e., with a distinctive capacity of the foreign
enterprise (13).
There are three primary ways for a direct investment to take
place. One is through the takeover of a firm through the purchase of
the stock of the firm by foreign investors. This may not lead to the
replacement of management by a foreign management team, but it would
lead to some effect on the behavior of management as discussed earlier
regarding control. The second way direct investment takes place is
through the formation of a new firm in the host area. This usually
results in a subsidiary wholly-owned either by an individual firm or a
consortium. Management for such a firm is supplied by the parent
firm(s) so investment thus involves the international transfer of an
entrepreneurial-technical resource complementary to capital
accompanying the capital transfer. The new firm is supplied money
capital by the parent(s), or from borrowing in the host area to
purchase assets which can be acquired through purchase of an existing
10
firm, or through the construction of new facilities in the host area
(14) .
Therefore, a "direct investor" is a person within the U.S. who
owns or acquires, directly or indirectly: (a) a 10% voting interest
in a foreign corporation, (b) a 10% interest in the profits of a
partnership organized under the laws of a foreign country, or (c) a
10% interest in a business venture conducted within a foreign country.
The direct investor can be an affiliated, associated or family group
(15) •
The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations (FDIR) apply to the
"direct investor" (DI), any individual or business concern within the
United States that directly or indirectly owns, holds, or acquires a
10% or greater interest in an incorporated or unincorporated foreign
entity. Three fundamental requirements are imposed on all DIs: (a)
annual direct investment must not exceed a level set by general
allowables provided for in the Regulations or by specific
authorization; (b) liquid foreign balance of affiliated foreign
nationals must be held to a level specified in the Regulations; (c)
reports reflecting allowables and transactions relevant to foreign
direct investment activity must be filed with the Office of Foreign
Direct Investments (OFDI), the bureaucracy within the Commerce
Department that administers the program (16).
1.3 Meaning of "Affiliated Foreign Nationals"
Generally, any foreign national in which a person within the U.S.
owns a direct or indirect interest of 10% or more is considered to be
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an "affiliated foreign national" (AFN). The exceptions to this
general rule are as follows: (a) a foreign corporation, partnership
or business venture, if it is a nonprofit operation engaged
exclusively in charitable, educational, religious, scientific,
literary or similar activities, (b) a foreign business venture other
than a corporation or partnership, if the gross assets of the venture
do not exceed $50,000 at any time during the year, or if the venture
began during the year and is not expected to continue operations for
longer than twelve consecutive months or does not, in fact, continue
for longer than twelve consecutive months. Thus, a job site of a
construction installation would not be considered a foreign venture if
the construction period is twelve months or less.
The FDIR set quotas for "direct investment" by a United States
"direct investor" in its "affiliated foreign nations" in any of three
groups of countries, or schedule area A, B, and C. Schedule A
countries are the less developed countries as defined for purposes of
the interest equalization tax; Schedule B countries are Middle Eastern
oil countries, most of the industrialized countries of the British
Commonwealth, and Japan. Canada, however, although technically
included in Schedule B, is for most practical purposes not affected by
the FDIR. Schedule C is generally referred to as a "higher"--that is,
more restrictive--schedule than Schedules A and B and, similarly,
Schedule B is considered "higher" than Schedule A (17).
A foreign national can be an AFN of only one scheduled area. If
the AFN conducts its business in more than one scheduled area, other
than through a branch, the scheduled area in which business is
12
conducted for the longest period of time during the year determines to
which scheduled area the AFN will be assigned.
A foreign business venture (other than a corporation or
partnership) carried on by employees or partners in one scheduled area
on behalf of a corporation or partnership organized in a different
scheduled area is considered a separate AFN of the direct investor in
the scheduled area in which it is operating if gross assets exceed
$50,000 (18).
So, "affiliated foreign nationals" are of three significant
types: (a) a corporation organized under the laws of a foreign
country, and its business ventures within the scheduled area of the
country of incorporation, (b) a business venture conducted within a
foreign country by employees or partners of the direct investor; and
(c) a business venture conducted by a foreign subsidiary outside its
scheduled area of incorporation (19).
Therefore, an affiliated foreign national is a business venture,
partnership or corporation which is within a foreign country and in
which a corresponding direct investor owns an interest of 10% or more.
The 10% rule is thus used not only to define the direct investor, but
also to determine which of his investments were subject to the
Regulations. Positive direct investment within the scope of the
Regulations only occurred in transactions involving a direct investor
and his AFNs. For example, suppose that x, a person within the United
States, owns 80% of company A and 5% of company B, both of which are
in Schedule C countries and are unrelated to each other. X is a
direct investor because of his 80% interest in company A. However,
13
only his investment in company A is covered by the Program since
company B is not an AFN of X. An exception to this ge~eral rule is
made where a business venture is conducted on behalf of an AFN by the
employees or partners thereof. Such a sub-venture is treated either
as a part of the AFN on whose behalf it is conducted, or as a separate
AFN of the direct investor, regardless of the extent of the direct
investor's interest in such sub-venture. This exception to the
general rule prevents evasion of the regulatory scheme through
fragmentation of investments in a loose managerial group.
The affiliated foreign national concept is defined to exempt
nonprofit organizations and business ventures with assets of not more
than $50,000 or which exist or reasonably expect to exist for less
than twelve months. The latter exemption is carefully circumscribed
by administrative interpretations, and the Secretary of Commerce has
retained authority to classify individual transactions notwithstanding
the Regulations (20).
1.4 The Importance of Foreign Direct Investment
The importance of foreign direct investment can be gauged in
several ways. First, considering the U.S. as the investing country,
there is the important development that long-term international
business activity has moved away from portfolio investment toward
foreign direct investment. Additionally, in terms of measuring the
volume of international trade, the dollar value of sales by American
foreign direct investments far surpasses the dollar value of export
trade from the U.S. Second, a major consequence of foreign direct
14
investment has been the emergence of corporate structures on a global
scale, the multinational enterprise. Third, the importance of foreign
direct investment can be evaluated in terms of the benefits derived,
not only for the investing firm, but also for the recipient (host)
nation as well (21).
Foreign direct investment may help transfer technology and
skills, provide management and training of local workers, aid in the
creation of indigenous skills in administration, marketing and other
business techniques, and "with appropriate safeguards" it can
contribute to the growth of local entrepreneurship. It may make for
more competitive markets, provide access to international markets,
contribute to tax revenues and help fill foreign exchange gaps.
Foreign direct investment may also create employment opportunities and
it may raise domestic wages. Thus, foreign direct investment would
seem to have the potential to contribute much needed resources to
developing countries (22).
What is the economic function of foreign direct investments (23)?
It is a transmission of a package of "managerial resources" from one
country to another. Managerial resources cover various managerial
skills, formally as the corps of managers, but more substantively,
representing such specialized and technological knowledge as
managerial expertise, patents and know-how, sales techniques,
abilities in securing raw materials and inputs and in obtaining funds
and credit, and the organization for information collection and
research and development. The transfer of the managerial resources
contributes to develop a new industry and other business activities in
15
the recipient country where the productivity of these managerial
resources is high due to their shortage relative to other factors of
production.
The importance of foreign direct investment has significantly
increased since World War II. The U.S. cumulative foreign investment
at the end of 1975 amounted to $133.2 billion, a figure equal to 8.8%
of the GNP. In that year the U.S. investment per capita was $623
(24). It was very remarkable that U.s. cumulative foreign investment
exceeded U.s. exports by 1.2 times. This fact suggests that the U.s.
evaluates her foreign direct investment as more important than her
foreign trade, letting the former substitute for the latter.
Policy makers in most industrialized countries have shown
interest in foreign direct investments for reasons other than national
security. Direct investments financed by parent firms or individuals
in a "source" country have an effect on the balance of payments for
both the source and the "host" country (25). Net outflows of direct
investment for a country will be reflected in downward pressure on the
exchange rate of the investing country, and vice versa for countries
experiencing net inflows. For a country attempting to maintain
exchange rate parities, this may pose some problems. Controls on
direct investment outflows have at times been implemented in an
attempt to relieve this pressure during periods of fixed exchange
rates.
16
1.5 Typical American Foreign Direct Investment
The typical American foreign direct investment is described by
Raymond Vernon and Stephen Hymer (26). The concern of Vernon and
others was to explain how a new product is invented and manufactured
on a large scale in leading industrial countries. Exports of this
product grow in so far as a "technological gap" exists between the
product-developing country and foreign countries. Foreign producers
imitate the new technology and follow suit. Then exports slow down
and through direct investment an attempt is made to secure foreign
markets. When the technology is standardized and widely disseminated
and the limit of scale economies is reached, trade based on wage
costs, or factor proportions, starts and the country turns to import
this product from abroad.
Prior to World War I, the emphasis was on United States
investment in natural resources abroad, although considerable
investment in Canada in all kinds of manufacturing activity had taken
place. After World War I, a considerable part of investment capital
was still going into the development of the natural resources of
foreign countries, but the emphasis had shifted to investment in
manufacturing activities (27).
1.6 The Role of the United States Government and Foreign Governments
The U.S. Government has wisely recognized the importance of
foreign investments by U.S. corporations as a means of strengthening
the U.S. economy, helping the economic development of other countries,
17
and helping to balance U.S. payments accounts. This was certainly the
viewpoint of the Truman Administration. Parallel with the Marshall
Plan and in fact in conjunction with it, investment guaranty programs
were developed and investment guaranty agreements were signed with
West European countries to encourage foreign investment and to
safeguard them against inconvertibility, expropriation, and war
damage. During the Eisenhower Administration, there were many
proposals for a reduction of taxes on income derived from foreign
operations, again as an inducement to investment abroad (28). The
Eisenhower Administration's views on this subject were expressed by
the Honorable Henry Kearns, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, on
December 1, 1958, before the House Ways and Means Committee. He
quoted President Eisenhower as saying:
Through increasing two-way international trade and
stimulating in every practical way the flow of private
investment abroad, we can strengthen the free world
including ourselves, in natural and healthy ways.
By doing so, the United States can eliminate the heavy burden of
foreign aid which she bears.
The bipartisan support of this view was expressed on March 9,
1965, by former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillion, speaking
before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee for the Johnson
Administration:
•... Whenever anyone asks me what is
the major reason you have long-term hope for major
improvements in our balance of payments, that is
18
the reason. It is the return from the private
investment that is abroad.
This viewpoint was supported on December 8, 1965, by another
spokesman for the Johnson Administration, the Honorable Henry H.
Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, before the u.S. Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce:
And we are equally aware--those of u.S.
in government as well as those in private
business--of the long-term importance to US, the
industrial development of other nations by u.S.
private corporations (29).
In that time the United States Government indicated the foreign
direct investment was very important, in fact, it was limited (30).
By far the greatest number of factors of concern to the United States
companies related to problems over which the United States government
could have little direct control.
Direct investment abroad by U.S. corporations in 1966 was the
subject of a U.S. Government Policy calling for "voluntary restraint,"
(31) because of the persistent U.S. balance of payment deficits.
Moreover, the rising tide of nationalism in both developed and
underdeveloped countries has created fears of American
"colonialization" and, in some instances, "domination" of domestic
industries. Some political leaders in the developed countries now
believe that they have a diminishing need for foreign capital,
technology and management.
19
In a number of less developed countries, certain political
leaders have manifested a distinct preference for
government-to-government grants and loans for local- and state-owned
enterprises over the entry of foreign private capital. It thus
becomes relevant to evaluate the impact of U.S. direct investment on
the U.S. balance of payments, employment, economic growth, and the
economic development of the recipient countries.
Practically all the problems about which companies were concerned
related to matters over which foreign governments had some control.
Exchange convertibility, tariffs and trade barriers, stability,
foreign government attitude and laws, foreign taxation, labor
legislation, and the like, are all matters concerning foreign
governments directly (32). Many actions suggested by United States
companies will not be easy for foreign governments to accomplish.
Some of the problems about which United States companies complain are
beyond the direct control of foreign governments. Although a
government may make its laws more favorable toward foreign investment,
or may adopt a more favorable attitude toward United States companies,
it may be able to do little about the balance of payments that account
for the exchange inconvertibility which is the main concern of United
States investors.
The companies do not always seem to realize that it is not
possible for foreign governments to make exchange readily available to
United States companies. Many do not seem to understand that in many
cases the countries do not have dollar exchange; therefore they cannot
make it available. Companies have few suggestions for ways in which
20
foreign governments can balance their payments and obtain the
necessary foreign exchange.
Still there are ways, as the answers to a number of questions
have revealed, in which a foreign government can act. Foreign
governments can remove certain obstacles and impediments directly
under their control if they wish to attract greater United States
investment.
Thus, the acceptance and approval of applications for direct
investment from a multinational firm seeking to set up operations in a
foreign country is not simply a matter of routine. On the host
country side of the investment equation policymakers in the recipient
nation must address themselves to a number of questions (33). For
example, could the local economy have acquired an injection of capital
or rejuvenation of resources and productivity on some basis other than
direct investment? What is the potential impact of foreign control
over local resources? To paraphrase Raymond Vernon, is the existence
of foreign-controlled subsidiaries compatible with the need to be
master in one's own house? And what of the desire of the investing
company's horne government? Will the home government seek to pursue
political or economic policies (extraterritoriality) through a
subsidiary of a horne-based parent firm carefully placed somewhere in
the host country? Foreign-owned subsidiaries have little or no
allegiance to the host nation. What is to prevent the foreign
subsidiary from leaving the production site and thus generating
economic dislocation? And what of the repatriation of profits from
the host country to the horne country? Is repatriation to be allowed
21
and if so to what extent? What are some of the fears and tensions
that foreign direct investment generates in the host country? There
is first the fear of foreign control of important sectors of the
economy. Managerial control, decisions affecting the
affiliate--whether it will expand or contract, what it will make, what
markets it will service, and so forth--are made not by the local
national who may be in charge of local operations but by the foreign
parent domiciled in another country.
22
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CHAPTER II
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
2.1 Meaning of Balance of Payments
The balance of payments statement is a statistical summary of the
multitudinous economic transactions carried on each year between
residents of the United States and those of all other countries,
either as private individuals or business organizations or through
their respective governments (1). It encompasses not only the
commercial movement of goods, services, and funds between this country
and the rest of the world, but also private remittances in the form of
personal gifts and donations by charitable agencies, and Government
grants, neither of which give rise to financial claims.
The major components of the United States balance of payments are
exports and imports; services, which include transportation charges,
tourist expenditures, insurance payments, royalties, fees for
professional services, and other miscellaneous items; income from
investments, namely, interest, rents, dividends, and profits; private
investment capital (short-/and/long-term) and U.S. Government
transfers (2). Items in each of these categories appear in the
balance of payments statement as receipts when the income therefrom
originates abroad and is paid to recipients in this country.
Similarly, when they represent payments originating in this country
and directed to foreign recipients, they are included as expenditures.
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The Government transfers category comprises a number of items. On the
receipts side, it includes interest on loans and credits ext~nded by
agencies of the U.S. Government to foreign governments and
international agencies; repayment of principal on such loans and
credits; and payments for Government exports of military and
non-military goods, including surplus agricultural commodities. On
the payment side, this category takes in loans and credits extended to
foreign governments, interest paid to foreign holders of Federal
obligations, principally Treasury bills and U.S. Government Bonds;
expenditures in support of this country's military establishments
abroad; pension payments to foreign residents; and foreign aid.
Foreign aid, in turn, includes both economic and military grants
(unilateral transfers) and loans.
2.2 Balance of Payments Deficit
One of the most serious and pressing economic problems
confronting the United States in 1966 was the persistent and
substantial deficit in its balance of international payments. This
problem had been developing since the final quarter of 1949. The
average deficits between 1950 and 1956 were in the magnitude of $1.5
billion. From 1958 through 1964, these deficits had ranged between $3
and $4 billion. In 1965, the deficit was reduced to $1.3 billion (3),
but there were many special, one-time factors involved, such as the
liquidation of deposits abroad by U.S. corporations and a sharp drop
in banking credits to foreigners. A phenomenon that has lasted for 15
out of 16 years clearly cannot be considered temporary.
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The persistent deficits in the United States' balance of
international payments since 1949 resulted in large outflows of gold
and substantial increases in foreign holdings of liquid dollar assets,
which were considered to be claims against gold (4). In 1958, the net
outflow of gold amounted to $2.3 billion. Gold lost during the
three-year period 1959-1961 totaled $3.2 billion (5).
Several analytic studies (6) investigating the linkage between
direct investment abroad and the balance of payments have focused on
the recoupment period, or number of years required for an initial
capital outflow to generate an equal inflow of investment income and
net trade receipts (7).
The foreign direct investment affects the balance of payments in
the following manner (8): (a) When U.S. direct investment abroad is
undertaken there is normally an outflow of capital from the United
States. Even though such investment has been financed to a
significant extent in recent years by funds obtained abroad, it
usually is accompanied by at least some transfer of capital from the
parent company. (b) Direct investments abroad generate a stream of
earnings in subsequent years, part of which is remitted to the U.S.
parent company in the form of dividends, interest and branch profits.
There may also be other types of remittance from the affiliates to the
parents, such as royalties and fees for the use of patents and
managerial services. (c) There is a variety of possible merchandise
trade flows generated by U.S. direct investment abroad. Capital
equipment may be exported in connection with the establishment or
expansion of productive facilities abroad, as well as to meet
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replacement needs. There may be exports from the United States of
intermediate goods for further processing or assembly abroad by the
affiliates. Some goods may be shipped to foreign affiliates for
immediate resale, with the affiliates acting chiefly as foreign sales
outlets for U.S. products. Foreign direct investment by U.S.-based
MNCs may also indirectly stimulate demand for U.S. exports through
income effects in the host country. On the other hand, U.S. exports
may be displaced by the foreign subsidiaries' production and sale of
goods that would otherwise have come from the United States. U.S.
imports may likewise be affected by foreign direct investment, as some
goods formerly produced by the parents are now produced at less cost
by the foreign affiliates and shipped back to the United States. (d)
Other items in the balance of payments may be affected such as travel,
transportation, payments of interest on foreign borrowings, and other
services related to the foreign investment. These items are generally
minor relative to capital flows, income on direct investments, and
merchandise trade. (e) Direct investment in the United States by
foreign-based MNCs also affects the U.S. balance of payments, the
effects being more or less the reverse of those generated from foreign
direct investment by U.S.-based MNCs. Such investment is small
relative to U.S. direct investment abroad, but it has grown
considerably in recent years.
Part of the problem in evaluating the balance of payments
position of the United States lies in the difficulty of selecting an
appropriate measure. Most analysts and officials now appear to agree
that the most relevant statistical series is the balance on current
29
and long-term capital accounts (9). This balance gives the net result
(adjusted for public and private remittances and gifts to foreigners)
of sales to and purchases from foreigners of merchandise, services,
long-term securities, and direct interests in productive enterprises.
The liquidity balance was introduce after World War II as a comparison
between U.S. liquid liabilities to all foreigners and U.S. ability to
payoff these liabilities from gold and other reserves. This measure
subsequently lost much of its relevance because by 1971 liquid
liabilities to foreigners were three times the U.S. reserve stock and
because the dissolution of the gold pool and the establishment of the
two-tier gold price system relieved the United States of any
obligation to intervene in private gold markets. The official
settlements balance is supposed to measure the extent of official
intervention in exchange markets that is required to maintain stable
exchange rate (10), but the validity of this calculation was impaired
by monetary authorities' transaction in the Euro-dollar market.
The balance on current and long-term capital accounts--sometimes
referred to as the basic balance--represents an effort to measure
structural forces influencing the external position of the United
States over the long run. This measure tends to be less volatile than
either the liquidity or the official settlements balance, since it
excludes international flows of most highly liquid assets. In 1970,
the deficit on current and long-term capital accounts totaled $3
billion, up slightly from $2.9 billion the previous year.
Balance-of-payments deficits per se imply nothing whatsoever
about the United States being in or out of equilibrium (11). Under
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conditions of world growth the United States generally would be
expected to have deficits using either the liquidity or the official
settlements definition of the balance of payments. Naturally, the
magnitude of U.S. deficits will depend upon the monetary policies of
the foreign countries and the United States. Large U.S. deficits will
be attained when foreign countries attempt to have tight monetary
policies and when the U.S. has an easy monetary policy. Under these
circumstances foreigners will attempt to augment their domestic
currency money balances by large amounts. Small U.S. deficits or
possibly even surpluses will be attained when foreign countries loosen
up in the money market and when the United States has a tight money
market. U.S. deficits, therefore, depend simultaneously upon U.S. and
foreign monetary policies.
Thus, the need for balance of payments adjustments arises from
disequilibrium payment position (12). Suppose a nation faces
prolonged balance of payments deficits. The capacity to finance a
deficit is limited by the stock of international reserves and the
willingness of other nations to accept these balances; continued
deficits ultimately impose pressures to eliminate the disequilibrium.
A nation experiencing surplus balance of payments positions year after
year may face undesirable economic growth rates, stimulating the rate
of inflation. Surplus nations should adjust to eliminate
disequilibriums although, unlike deficit nations, the incentive for
the restoration of equilibrium does not tend to be as pronounced. The
essential point is that prolonged balance of payments surpluses or
deficits are inefficient and must eventually be removed.
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The balance of payments deficits have occasioned a great deal of
analysis and research seeking causes and solutions (13). Capital
outflows in general and u.s. direct investment abroad in particular,
which are debit or negative items in the balance of payments accounts,
have come under especially close scrutiny. U.S. direct investment
abroad more than doubled between 1962 and 1965, leading in the latter
year to voluntary, and in 1968 to mandatory, controls, on such capital
outflows.
2.3 The Dollar Gap Solution
2.31 The Facts
The importance of the dollar stems from the fact that it serves
as an international reserve asset. Part of the reason why foreign
central banks and monetary authorities held dollars during the 60s was
that, at least in principle, the u.S. Treasury guaranteed that these
holdings could be converted into gold at the fixed rate of $35 per
ounce. Probably more important in explaining the dollar's continuing
appeal are the following facts: It has always been freely convertible
into other currencies, the risk of devaluation, a least in the past,
has been very low, and finally, the variety of quantity of goods which
can be purchased in this country are greater than anywhere else in the
world.
These factors were especially important in the 1940s and 1950s
when the United States was the only source of a large number of
products and when U.S. gold stock exceeded U.S. liabilities to
foreigners by a wide margin. Because of foreigners' complete faith in
l
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the stability of U.S. currency, central banks began to hold dollars
rather than gold when the United States ran a payments deficit during
the 1950s. Since the dollar was as good as gold, there was no reason
for holding the shiny, barren metal when one could earn interest by
buying short-term bonds, such as U.S. Treasury bills. Hence the fact
that New York City provides a very broad money market, making the
buying and selling of bonds very convenient and inexpensive, further
enhanced the attractiveness of the dollar (14). In addition, the mere
fact that most countries maintain the external value of their currency
by buying and selling dollars in the foreign exchange market means
that the dollar is a natural candidate for reserve currency status.
The United States could make payments to foreigners with its own
currency, rather than use its reserves, and the countries which chose
dollars rather than gold acquired an asset which was both more
convenient to use and more valuable insofar as the interest earnings
outweighed the risk of devaluation. Most important of all, the U.S.
deficit between 1950 and 1969 was a powerful engine for the creation
of international liquidity. It provided a crucial supplement to the
gold in the coffers of central banks. Between 1950 and the end of
1966, the stock of monetary gold rose from $35 billion to slightly
over $43 billion, or an increase of twenty-three percent. Dollar
reserves increased from $4 billion to $13.5 billion, or over 200
percent (15). There is little doubt that, by adding considerably to
world reserves, the U.S. payments deficit helped grease the wheels of
international trade and finance.
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The dominant factor shaping international financial diplomacy
since the end of World War II has been the evolution from "dollar
shortage" in the immediate postwar years to "dollar glut" since the
mid-1950's. Many economists believed that while the dollar was
undervalued until the mid-1950's, it then became overvalued until the
devaluations of August 1971 and February 1973 (16). Capital outflows
during 1970 began to put additional pressure on the dollar. To
promote more investment and expansion in the American economy, the
United States undertook an easing of monetary policy in the autumn of
1970. But tight monetary conditions in France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and most particularly, Germany encouraged large capital
inflows from the United States to these nations. By late 1970,
Germany's foreign exchange reserves rose to $13.5 billion--a larger
amount than before the 1969 revaluation of the mark and almost twice
what they had been earlier in the year (17). Of all the postwar
currency crises, the dollar crisis of August 1971 had the most
far-reaching implications--making the need for reform of the
international monetary system obvious. But there was a wide range of
opinion among government officials, the international financial
community, and academic economists as to the causes and the cures for
the dollar "deficit."
As one authority summarized the period since the war: On August
15, 1971, the United States placed the world on a virtually pure
dollar standard by suspending indefinitely the convertibility of .the
dollar into U.S. reserve assets (18). The postwar monetary system was
in its third phase. The first phase lasted through 1958, when only
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the dollar among major currencies was convertible into other
currencies and into the reserve assets of the issuing country. The
second phase lasted from 1959 until August 1971, when the currencies
of all major countries were convertible both into one another and into
their own reserves. The third phase began in August 1971, when the
dollar along with those major currencies became inconvertible into the
reserves of its issuing country, it remained convertible into other
currencies. So the dollar moved from being the only convertible major
currency to being, at least in part, the only inconvertible major
currency (19).
2.32 The Facts in Historical Perspective
Certain features stand out in the international monetary history:
(a) From 1950 to the 1971 crisis there was a persistent "deficit" in
the United States balance of payments (except for a single surplus in
1957); (b) The foreign holdings of dollar assets rose markedly
throughout the period, and the United States gold stock diminished
from $23 billion in 1957 to less than $11 billion at the time of the
gold crisis in March 1968; (c) But while the "deficit" in the United
States balance of payments served to provide additional liquidity to
the international monetary system, the very creation of the "deficit"
also undermined confidence in the future exchange rate stability of
the dollar; (d) Nonetheless, the do11ar--possessing some functions of
international money--retained a unique position in the gold-and-do11ar
reserve system. (e) For the United States, however, there was no
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readily available mechanism of adjustment to balance of payments
disequilibrium (20).
The basic soundness of the dollar was questioned whenever the
United States gold reserve declined to a level that caused foreigners
to doubt the ability of the United States to redeem outstanding
dollars with gold at the pegged price. Unless the United States
balance of payments position was maintained with some degree of
stability, it was inevitable that foreign ownership of dollars would
increase, thus giving rise to a corresponding increase in United
States liabilities. Even if the relative redemption percentage of
dollars into gold remained constant, the increase in dollars available
in foreign hands alone would result in a more rapid depletion of
United States gold reserves, which, in turn, would generate even less
confidence in the stability of the dollar (21). Thus the attention of
the international community was focused on the United States balance
of payments position and the fiscal policies that it reflected.
The emphasis on control of nuclear weapons and international
liquidity was not purely rhetorical. In the early 1960's these were
precisely the problems that were of major concern to the Kennedy
Administration (22). It was reported that:
The balance of payments remained a constant worry to
Kennedy. Of all the problems he faced as President,
one had the impression that he felt least at home with
this one. He used to tell his advisers that the two
things which scared him most were nuclear war and the
payment deficit. Once, he half-humorously derided the
notion that nuclear weapons were essential to
international prestige. "What really matters," he
said, "is the strength of the currency. It is this,
not the force de frappe, which makes France a factor.
Britain has nuclear weapons, but the pound is weak, so
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everyone pushes it around. Why are people so nice to
Spain today? Not because Spain has nuclear weapons
but because of all those lovely gold reserves." He
had acquired somewhere, perhaps from his father, the
belief that a nation was only as strong as the value
of its currency; and he feared that, if he pushed
things too far, "loss of confidence" would descend and
there would be a run on gold. But he was determined
not to be stamped into restrictive domestic measures,
and he brought steady pressures for remedies which
would not block expansion at home. The problem
perhaps constrained him more in foreign affairs. He
though, for example, that the continuing payments
deficit gave France, with its claims on American gold,
a dangerous international advantage; and at times he
even briefly considered doing things which would
otherwise run athwart his policy, like selling
submarines to South Africa, in the hope of relieving
the strain on the balance of payments (23).
To reach an understanding of the causes of the dollar "deficit" and to
appraise the significance of the accumulation of foreign holdings of
dollars and the gold outflow, the United States had to first
appreciate the special position of the dollar in the world monetary
system (24).
Furthermore, in analyzing United States balance of payments
policy, many economists have emphasized the international aSYmmetry in
the adjustment of balance of payments disequilibria as between the
United States and the rest of the world. A strong statement of this
follows (25):
At the moment .•• it is a dollar world, just as 1913
was a sterling world. In the view of some American
economists .•• this produces certain aSYmmetries in
financial relationships which are an inherent part of
the present system. Put baldly and with some
exaggeration, these are:
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(a) The dollar is the world medium of exchange,
unit of account, store of value, standard of deferred
payment. It is the vehicle currency through which
French francs are transferred into Deutschmarks, for
example, and lire into Danish kroner. No other currency
performs a similar role on a similar scale.
(b) If the dollar is a world money, the United
States is a bank and not a firm as other countries are.
The difference between a firm and a bank, of course, is
that the liabilities of the former are expected to be
paid off at regular intervals, while those of the latter
are passed from hand to hand as money, and tend to be
permanent in fact, despite being "demand" in form •••
To the extent that a country is a bank and not a firm,
its balance of payments must be viewed from a different
perspective, with equilibrium, deficits and a surplus
measured on a different basis.
(c) The dollar is a money's money, a numeraire for
foreign exchanges, and cannot be regarded as other
currencies. It cannot float, except as other currencies
float against it, and its value is the reciprocal of the
value of all other currencies, not its price in one.
(d) The United States can change the value of gold,
but not the price of the dollar. Other countries can
readily change the value of their currencies against the
dollar, but not the price of gold.
At the close of World War II, the economies of the principal
competitors of the United States, Europe and Japan, were in a state of
ruin. Their production capabilities had largely been destroyed and
their monetary reserves were virtually depleted. Physical and
financial reconstruction became the first order of business, and the
influential "new economists" of that day believed that reconstruction
could only be accomplished by a massive infusion of aid to Europe in
the form of grants. European Recovery Program grants were favored
over loans because of the then accepted theory that there would be a
permanent deficit relationship between the European monetary position
and that of the United States. These supposedly incurable imbalances
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in international trade would result in a dollar shortage abroad, and
it was feared that the imposition of additional debt on Eurcpean
nations would lead to an economic collapse similar to that of the
thirties. Thus a decision was made to solve the problem of debt
repayment by not creating debts in the first place.
By 1956, it became apparent that Europe and Japan were well on
their way to economic recovery. The monetary reserves of European
nations were growing, and the United States was experiencing only
moderate payments deficits averaging slightly more than $1 billion per
year. At first, the deficit was welcomed because it portended the
alleviation of the dollar shortage that the economists believed
otherwise insoluble. In 1958, however, an alarming deficit of $3.4
billion appeared, and dwindling gold reserves became a greater menace
than world dollar shortages (26). In retrospect, the
grants-instead-of-loans policy carried out under the Marshall Plan was
described as one of the "monumental blunders of economic forecasting"
of all time. If the economic planners had placed more confidence in
the eventual success of their programs to rebuild the European
economy, many of the dollars held by foreigners would have been
returned to the United States in the form of loan repayments.
On November 1, 1978, the President of the United States announced
a radical program of support for the dollar (27). This program was a
departure from his previous policies which were constrained by fear of
causing a domestic economic recession. The new policies were made
necessary by dramatic events in the financial markets during the week
of October 23, 1978. Decline of the dollar in the world exchanges
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suggested panic dumping the dollar holdings. It was not only the
depreciation of the dollar, but, also the rate of deprecietion of the
dollar that forced a broad program of support.
2.4 United States Balance of Payments programs
By 1960, the United States balance of payments problem had so
increased in severity that governmental action could no longer be
avoided. The initial attack was launched by President Kennedy in 1961
against the "abuse of foreign 'tax havens' by American capital abroad
as a means of tax avoidance." Pursuant to his request, Congress
enacted the Revenue Act of 1962, which in part sought to eliminate the
preferential treatment enjoyed by American capital abroad by imposing
a tax on earnings of controlled foreign corporations (28). Numerous
administrative programs were also inaugurated for the purpose of
increasing American exports, reducing foreign exchange costs of
military expenditures abroad, and increasing the inflow of foreign
investment capital.
2.41 The Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1963
In order to reduce capital outflow, the Revenue Act of 1962,
amended the tax code to make certain investments in developed foreign
countries less attractive and encouraged repatriation of earnings of
controlled foreign corporations. The Interest Equalization Tax (lET)
was enacted in 1963 to equalize the cost of raising equity capital in
United States and abroad and to discourage foreign sales in the United
States of foreign equity or debt securities (29). This measure
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represented the first direct restriction imposed by the American
government on the free international mobility of capital 3nd money.
In essence, the Interest Equalization Tax of 1963 was designed to
offset higher foreign interest rates through the imposition of an
excise tax on the acquisition of foreign debt obligations and
securities (30). The stated purpose of the lET was to bring the cost
of long-term financing in the United States by foreign concerns into
better alignment with the higher costs prevailing in foreign markets
(31). The interest rate differential was narrowed by the imposition
of a flat excise tax on the purchase of foreign stocks or debt
obligations. The lET was not intended to eliminate completely foreign
portfolio investments, but rather to moderate the outflow of capital
to a level in harmony with investment considerations other than
interest rate differentials.
Originally, a "temporary" tax measure with an intended existence
of only two years, the lET was latter extended for the second time to
end on July 31, 1969. Further, revisions of the lET make it an even
more valuable control device by giving the President discretion to
adjust the tax rate within a range equivalent to an annual interest
cost of zero to one and one-half percent. All foreign business
transactions, however, were not included within the scope of the lET.
The principal exemptions from the tax were direct foreign investment
(32), investments in less-developed countries, and export financing.
These exemptions were justified on the grounds that the lET was not
applicable to normal international business transactions and was
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intended to relieve balance of payments pressures only by means of
compensating for interest rate differentials.
2.42 Voluntary Program of Foreign Investment and Credit Restraints
The Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraints Program, designed to curb
foreign lending by financial institutions, was also announced as part
of President Johnson's 1965 Balance of Payments Message (33).
Guidelines designed to restrain the growth of foreign credit and
reduce liquid balances held abroad were established by the Federal
Reserve Board for both bank and nonbank financial institutions. Both
groups were also asked to observe a system of priorities according to
which attention would be given first to application by American firms
for export credits, secondly to applications from less-developed
countries for nonexport credits, and lastly to applications from
Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, which depend largely upon the
United States as their principal source of financing.
In order to stem the rapidly increasing outflow of private
capital expressly excluded from the lET, in February, 1965, President
Johnson invited some 370 business leaders to the White House to
discuss the payments problem. He asked for their "voluntary"
cooperation in a plan to reduce dollar outflows and repatriate foreign
earnings and liquid foreign balances (34). Ultimately, some 900
companies were asked to participate in the Voluntary Cooperation
Program. The companies were asked to establish balance of payments
ledgers and to improve their payments contribution by some fifteen to
twenty percent each. The Secretary of Commerce emphasized that the
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program applied only to investment in industrial countries and did not
change the government's policy of encouraging investment in less
developed areas. The Department of Commerce guidelines included
abandoning or deferring plans for future direct investment, resorting
to foreign capital markets for funds, and accelerating repatriation
through dividends. Each business was asked to make quarterly reports
to the Secretary of Commerce. According to the Department of Commerce
these voluntary restraints proved successful in curbing the outflow of
private capital (35), and attributing the simplicity of the credit
controls (36). Nevertheless, critics maintained that the program was
not effective to the degree claimed and, further, that it was
detrimental to the relations between the United States and nations
subject to the program's restraints. It was agreed, however, that one
clearly beneficial outgrowth of the program was the creation of
European financial syndicates capable of supplying American companies
with capital for use in foreign operations.
2.43 Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966
The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, which complemented the
1963 program by approaching the balance of payments problem from the
opposite direction-encouraging foreigners to invest in the United
States. Prior to this enactment, a foreign corporation, in addition
to paying tax on the profits of its American operations, also had to
include unconnected investment earnings in normal corporate income.
The Act established a separate preferential tax rate for income "not
effectively connected" with business operations in the United States.
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According to the Treasury of the U.S., this preferential treatment of
foreign corporations encouraged them to invest in domestic stocks, and
was responsible for the reversal from a deficit to a surplus in the
balance of payments account for stock transactions (37).
The Act exempted from income taxation interest received from
domestic banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance
companies, and applied a flat 30 percent tax rate, rather than
imposing progressive domestic rates, on United States-source income
that was not "effectively connected" with a trade or business in the
United States (38). Also, foreign investors were enabled to trade on
United States exchanges without being considered as engaged in a
United States business and subject to income taxation by this country.
So, the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 was passed to provide
further balance of payments relief by attracting foreign portfolio
investment capital to the United States. Under the Act, income from
portfolio investments of foreign investors is taxed at a lower rate
than income from American business investments.· Although whatever
success the Act enjoyed may be partially attributable to the favorable
tax treatment, it is more likely that foreign investors were attracted
by the comparative political and financial stability of the United
States. Regardless of the reasons, the inflow of foreign portfolio
capital was increased (39) substantially after the Act was passed, but
not enough to correct the balance of payments deficits.
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2.44 The Balance of Payments Action Program of 1968
On January 1, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson brought into
being a new legal specialty (40). On that date, he signed an
executive order prohibiting any "direct or indirect transfer of
capital to or within any foreign country or to any national thereof
outside the United States." The prohibition was directed to "any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" who "owns or
acquires as much as a 10% interest in the voting securities, capital
or earnings of a foreign business venture." The executive order
further authorized the Secretary of Commerce to implement its
provisions, and pursuant to this authority the Secretary on the same
day published the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations (FDIR) and
established the Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI) within the
Commerce Department to administer the Regulations.
President Johnson announced the decision to impose mandatory
controls on foreign direct investments (41). The statement outlined a
seven-point program designed to bolster confidence in the dollar and
to deal with the balance of payments deficit. Four of the seven
measures were described as "temporary" of which two--compu1sory
restraints on direct investment abroad and additional controls on
foreign lending by American financial institutions--became effective
immediately (42). Along with an appeal to business and labor for
wage-price restraints and avoidance of export-crippling work
stoppages, the President directed that further study be undertaken or
appropriate legislation be introduced for the other five measures.
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The goal of the mandatory controls for 1968 was a one billion
dollar reduction in the foreign direct investment balance of payments
category from the 1967 level of $3.7 billion. The actual reduction
was more than twice as much, but this accomplishment was more than
offset by the virtual domination of the nation's traditional trade
balance surplus. Although an overall balance of payments surplus was
achieved for 1968, this was regarded as due to transitory factors and
not a fundamental improvement (43).
The Regulations have been roundly criticized, publicly and
privately, both at home and abroad. The legal authority underlying
the Regulations was attacked as at best questionable. It has also
been charged that direct investment controls contravened the nation's
international legal and treaty obligations and represented an unsound
and harmful foreign policy. The control and curtailment of foreign
investment was challenged as an ill-advised economic policy, which in
fact harmed this country's balance of payments. The Congress itself
had embraced this point of view and called upon President Nixon to
terminate the Regulations at the earliest possible date (44). On the
other hand, the program's supporters, in addition to refuting the
above contentions, stressed that the program's purpose was not to
restrict direct investment, but only to shift its financing from
United States sources to foreign sources. Statistics were marshalled
to prove that investment was not diminished but actually increased.
The remainder of this thesis seeks to define and analyze the
relevant legal and policy issues that the Regulations raised and
attempts to evaluate the purposes, the effectiveness, and the wisdom
of the program in light of the monetary crisis with which it was
designed to deal.
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CHAPTER III
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROGRAM --
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS
Restrictions of foreign direct investments varied depending upon
the nationality of the AFN. The nations of the world were divided
into three classifications--Schedule A, B, C as mentioned above.
Despite the broadly worded prohibitions, there were certain foreign
direct investments excluded from the scope of the Regulations. If a
DI's total positive direct investment was less than $200,000 per year,
he was outside the scope of the Regulations, and compliance with the
balance of payments program was not mandatory.
General and specific exemptions to the investment restrictions
were provided for by the Regulations. A general exemption of
"authorization" was an exemption contained in the Regulations or
issued pursuant thereto and published in the Federal Register. A
specific authorization was an administration ruling granted at the
discretion of the Office of Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) upon
application by a DI. Of course, persons who did not have a sufficient
interest in a foreign enterprise were not DI's and, therefore, were
not within the scope of the FDIR. Organizations that otherwise
fulfilled the requirements of an AFN were specifically excluded if the
operations were solely of a charitable, educational, scientific,
cultural or nonprofit nature.
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All banks and financial institutions that were subject to the
Foreign Credit Restraint Program of the Federal Reserve were exempt
from the provisions of the FDIR if so certified by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Another exemption was
created when, as a result of negotiations between the United States
and Canada, the Regulations were amended to authorize unlimited direct
investments in Canadian AFN's.
Furthermore, the FDIR prohibited direct investment during any
year in the investor's affiliated foreign nationals except within the
investor's general authorization limits, the "allowables," or as
permitted on application by specific authorization or exemption.
Except where permission was given to measure compliance on the basis
of the investor's fiscal year, direct investment was computed on the
basis of the calendar year in order to coincide with the nation's
balance of payments reporting. However, the investor could elect to
treat dividends from incorporated affiliated foreign nationals--a
reduction of direct investment--which were received within sixty days
after the end of each year as received during the preceding year.
Also, the investor could allocate foreign borrowing proceeds to direct
investment--reducing the latter- after year end if the proceeds were
available at year end and the allocation was reported on the
investor's annual report to OFDI due within 120 days after year end
(1) •
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3.1 The Elements of Foreign Direct Investment
The two components of direct investment were "transfers of
capital" to the investor's affiliated foreign nationals and
"reinvested earnings" of the investor's incorporated affiliated
foreign nations (2). Although, in their earlier phases, there were
distinctions between these two components in many significant
respects, the two were subsequently merged in measuring compliance
with investment allowables. Thus, for most purposes, the significant
figure was the net totals, and the investor could deduct the available
proceeds of long-term foreign borrowings expended in making transfers
of capital or allocated to such transfer or to reinvested earnings.
3.11 Transfers of Capital
What is a transfer of capital? The first version of the
Regulations characterized a transfer of capital in terms of--a
transfer of capital! "The term 'transfer of capital' shall mean a
transfer of capital ••• to or on behalf of, or for the benefit of an
affiliated foreign national ••• " Several examples of such transfers
by a direct investor were given in most general terms, including a
"net contribution to the capital" of an AFN, an "acquisition of an
interest in, or an increase in net interest in" an AFN, a "net
increase in loans or advances upon open account" to an AFN, the
acquisition of bonds or other debt of an AFN to the extent that such
amount exceeded the AFN's acquisition of the direct investor's
obligations, and the discharge by the direct investor of its own
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obligation incurred by guaranteeing or assuming that of the AFN (3).
Aside from being left somewhat in the dark throughout as to what a
transfer of capital was really all about, the direct investor was told
that particular transactions constituted transfers of capital, while
the transactions themselves were described in net terms. The
important question then became: How should one calculate a transfer
of capital with respect to an active foreign subsidiary with which the
direct investor was constantly engaged in matters of business? Did a
transfer of capital occur whenever the direct investor's net position
was positive? These were questions of moment, for both the Executive
Order and the Regulations spoke in terms of certain transactions
involving transfers of capital being flatly "prohibited," and carried
criminal sanctions (4). On the other hand, the worldwide $100,000
authorization made no reference to particular transactions or to
transfers or to transfers of capital, speaking only of direct
investment in the prescribed amount being authorized. The provisions
authorizing direct investment by scheduled area on the basis of prior
investment were phrased in terms of transfers of capital resulting in
direct investment.
It was understood at OFDI that "transfers of capital" were a
constituent element of "direct investment," and that those
transactions which increased the direct investor's equity interest in
the AFN or which increased the indebtedness of the AFN to the direct
investor were "transfers of capital" whatever the form of the
transaction. There was a great deal of confusion to be cleared away
in giving expression to such an idea. For example, an early
54
explanation or summary of the Regulations issued by the Commerce
Department mentioned an exemption for "current transactions." In
fact, no such exemption was stated in such terms throughout the
Regulations; apparently, the drafters felt that the references to
"capital" were obviously exclusive of that which was not capital and,
after all, current expenses simply were not transfers of capital.
This characterization of current expenses found support in the
International Monetary Fund Agreement, which refers to payments in
connection with foreign trade and other current business as "payments
which are not for the purpose of transferring capita1." Despite the
initial ambiguity, then it was agreed that money sent abroad to pay
the rent on the foreign branch office or the salaries of its personnel
was a "current payment," an expense of business, and not a transfer of
capital (5).
Generally, a transfer of capital referred to any transaction
involving funds or other property that increases or decreases a DI's
aggregate equity, profit, or debt interest in an AFN (6). Transfers
of capital by a DI to an AFN were regarded differently, however, from
transfers of capital by an AFN to a DI. The FDIR defined the
transfers of capital by a DI to an AFN in very broad terms,
concentrating more on the substance rather than the form of the
transactions. The following examples were listed in the Regulations,
but were not, however, meant to be exhaustive:
Acquisition by a DI of an equity or profit
interest in an AFN, acquisition by a DI of any
item of indebtedness or liability of an AFN
(including loans or advances on open account such
as export credit sales); a contribution by a DI to
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the capital of an AFN; the satisfaction by the DI
of any debt owed by the DI to an AFN; the
reduction of an equity interest in the DI held by
the AFN; the repayment of any long-term foreign
borrowing; the complete or partial satisfaction by
the DI of any debts of the AFN, whether or not
guaranteed or assumed by the DI; a transfer by the
AFN of any equity or debt interest in the DI held
by the AFN; and a lease of property by the DI to
the AFN not expected to be returned within the
year and having a useful life of a year or more.
On the other hand, transfers of capital by an AFN
to a DI were defined in substantially more limited
terms, and the specific transfers enumerated in
section IOOO.312(b) were defined as the only
transactions considered transfers.
Current non-capital transactions which were excluded from any
computation of direct investment included increases in the equity
interest of any incorporated AFN because of reinvestment of AFN
earning, changes in the value of assets resulting from their
reappraisal, loans to AFNs that were guaranteed by a DI, the payment
of interest and other expenses currently due in connection with
borrowings, rental payments currently due, royalty payments currently
due under license agreements, and transfers of patents, trademarks,
and other intangible rights or interests. A current transaction
involving immediate cash payment for goods sold or services rendered
were not, then, a transfer of capital. If, on the other hand, a DI
sold goods on credit or rendered services on account, its debt
investment was increased and the transactions were a capital transfer.
Subsequent payment by an AFN was, of course, also a transfer.
In other words, the term "transfers of capital," one of two
components of direct investment, referred to a change in the equity
and debt position of a direct investor. A change in holdings of debt
of the direct investor was also regarded as atransfer of capital, but
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these were relatively uncommon as, by definition, the direct investor
needed to hold at least a ten percent interest in each affiliate (7).
Capital may flow in either direction. As funds are contributed
or loaned by a direct investor to its affiliates there is an outward
or "positive" transfer of capital. As the affiliate repays
indebtedness or is liquidated there is a "negative" transfer. It is
the net outward flow, or net positive transfer of capital, within a
compliance period which the Regulations limited as one of the two
components of direct investment.
Contributions to the capital of or loans to incorporated
affiliated foreign nations by direct investors were the most common
types of capital transfers, but were not necessarily formal stock
purchases or loans. It was sufficient if funds or property were
transferred to the affiliate without an offsetting transfer of funds
or property by the affiliate, e.g., the sale of merchandise on open
account to an affiliate results in a transfer of capital. The leasing
of property to an affiliate also was regarded as a transfer of capital
if the property had more than a one-year life and was not to be
returned within that period.
Noncapital transactions with affiliates (or with third parties on
behalf of affiliates) did not enter into the capital transfer
computations. Such transactions included the payment of interest, the
payment of rent, the payment of license royalties, the making of a
guarantee, a reappraisal of assets, the reinvestment of corporate
earnings, or the transfer of patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade
names, trade secrets, technology, proprietary processes, proprietary
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information or similar intangibles or any rights or interests therein
or applications or contracts relating thereto (except under unusual
circumstances).
Acquisitions of interests in affiliated foreign nationals from
third parties were considered to represent a transfer of capital
unless the transferor of the interest was a direct investor. The
transfer was deemed to be to the place where the affiliate was
located, not to the place where the transferor of the interest was
located. If the transferor was a direct investor there was no
transfer of capital, but the transferee becoming a direct investor by
virtue of the acquisition succeeded to the transferor's investment
position with respect to the acquired interest. Where a direct
investor came to be such through gradual acquisition of the requisite
ten percent interest in an affiliate, a special rule picked up all
capital transfers in the twelve months preceding the date on which the
ten percent ownership level was attained. Dispositions of interests
in or obligations of an affiliated foreign national were regarded as
negative capital transfers only if the transferee of the interest was
a foreign national or, in certain cases, a bank or other financial
institution.
Other third-party transactions could result in a transfer of
capital. If the direct investor discharged the obligation of an
affiliated foreign national to a third party, pursuant to a guarantee
or otherwise, a transfer of capital to that affiliate was deemed to
result. Likewise, if the investor made a deposit with a foreign bank
or otherwise transferred securities or obligations of a nonaffiliated
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foreign issuer to secure the transfer of funds or property by a
foreign party to the investor's affiliate, there was deemed to be a
transfer of capital to that affiliate. And, if the direct investor
repaid a long-term foreign borrowing the proceeds of which were
expended in making or allocated to an earlier direct investment in an
affiliate, that repayment was deemed to be a transfer of capital to
the place of the affiliate to which the borrowing proceeds were
allocated at the time. A refinancing of such a borrowing by its
renewal, extension, or continuance or by a replacement long-term
foreign borrowing was not considered a repayment, but the delivery of
equity securities pursuant to conversion rights granted to holders of
the debt was regarded as a repayment.
Cross-schedule, interaffiliate capital transfers entered into the
investment calculations of the Regulations only if at least one of the
affiliates was majority-owned by the direct investor. If that was the
case the transfer was regarded as flowing from the transferor to the
direct investor (a negative investment) and thence from the investor
to the transferee (a positive investment). Interaffiliate capital
transfers were also disregarded, even with majority-ownership of
either or both by the direct investor, if the transfer resulted from
an ordinary arm-length trade credit extended by one affiliate to the
other paid within twelve months, provided neither affiliate was
Canadian.
In the case of unincorporated affiliates, net capital transfers
during any period to (or from) an unincorporated affiliated foreign
national were measured by the increase (or decrease) in the direct
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investor's share of the net assets (disregarding any debt or ownership
relationship with the direct investor) of the affiliate. If an
unincorporated affiliated generated income and this was not remitted
to the investor, net assets increase and a transfer of capital was
deemed to have occurred to the extent of the investor's share of those
earnings. On the other hand, these earnings did not enter into the
reinvested earnings component of direct investment. Similarly, if
funds were loaned or contributed to the unincorporated affiliate by
the direct investor, net assets increased since the equity or debt
change was ignored and a transfer of capital was deemed to have
occurred. However, in the case of unincorporated affiliates, such as
partnerships and joint ventures, which were not wholly-owned by the
direct investor, transfers by co-owners did not enter into these
computations and the direct investor's transfers were fully included
despite the investor's less than 100 percent interest in the
affiliate's net assets.
A transfer of capital could be charged to the account of a direct
investor in some circumstances even if the investor was not a party to
the particular transaction involving the transfer (8). This occurred
when the direct investor owned at least fifty percent of one or both
of two AFNs in different scheduled areas; if one of these AFNs made a
transfer of capital to the other, the direct investor was deemed to
have a negative transfer of capital from the transferor and a positive
transfer of capital to the transferee.
The purpose of charging the direct investor with transfers of
capital arising out of such a transaction between its AFNs was to
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insure that an investment was associated with the scheduled area in
which the funds were ultimately used. Thus, where the direct investor
had less than fifty percent control of both parties, he was not
charged with the transfers of capital because he theoretically could
not control them. Conversely, where the direct investor did control
at least one of the parties, he was generally (9) charged with the
full value of the transfers.
Thus, the prohibited transfer of capital matured into a balance
sheet concept (10): the direct investor's outflows and inflows during
the period in a given schedule area were totalled and offset against
one another. If the inflow figure was larger, the investor had a
"negative" net transfer of capital in that area, for which no
authorization was required. If the outflow figure was larger, the
amount by which it was larger was the "positive" net transfer of
capital which, as a constituent element of direct investment, had to
be authorized under the Regulations. A direct investor could not be
prosecuted for a single transaction, because any single transaction
might be of no net effect since it could be offset before the end of
the year either by the transaction being undone in such time or by
another transaction involving a transfer of equal or greater amount to
an AFN or AFNs in the same scheduled area. Accordingly, the
Regulations prohibited "a positive net transfer of capital" as well as
"positive direct investment" which was in turn defined in terms of
"net transfer of capital."
So, a net transfer of capital was defined in terms of all of a
direct investor's AFNs in a particular scheduled area. From a balance
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of payments point of view, it mattered not at all whether a direct
investor had one AFN or hundreds in a particular country or area.
What was of importance was the sum total of transactions to a
particular country or area. For the foregoing reason, the separate
identities of all of a direct investor's foreign business operations
within the same scheduled area were ignored, for their numbers did not
affect the sum of the transactions between the direct investor and his
AFNs in the area. A French subsidiary could loan money to a German
branch operation of the direct investor or could create a Swiss
holding company and transfer to it the capital stock of the
subsidiary's corporate operations in Sweden, Spain, Belgium and Italy.
No net transfer of capital had been made by the direct investor to its
AFNs in Schedule C (11). The Swedish, Spanish and Italian companies
could pay dividends to the Swiss holding company while the Swiss
company lent money to the Belgian company; these inter-company
transactions in the same scheduled area were ignored under the
Regulations. Even the dividends would not be treated as a net
transfer of capital by the direct investor to its AFNs in Schedule C,
and whether the Schedule C AFNs had earnings or not, for purposes of
the Regulations, would be determined as though all the AFNs in
Schedule C were one company (12).
3.12 Reinvested Affiliate Earnings
In addition to a direct investor's net transfer of capital to a
schedule area, the direct investor's share of the retained, or
"reinvested" earnings of its AFNs in the scheduled area had to be
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included in the calculation of the investor's total direct investment
(13). The Regulations gradually clarified the method of computing
earnings reinvested in AFNs. Originally, reinvested earnings were
defined as "the earnings of an affiliated foreign national available
at any time for distribution and not so distributed." The definition,
which applied only to incorporated AFNs because the earnings of an
unincorporated AFN fell within the definition of a net transfer of
capital, was substantially more detailed. The reinvested earnings
component of a direct investor's total direct investment in a given
scheduled area was defined as the direct investor's share of the
aggregate net earnings of all the investor's AFNs in the instant
scheduled area, less all dividends distributed by them to the direct
investor or to AFNs of the investor in other scheduled areas, and
augmented by dividends received by the instant AFNs from AFNs of the
direct investor in other scheduled areas and also by "earnings
remitted" to the instant AFNs by their extra-area branches. In
general, then, it may be said that under the Regulations earnings were
considered reinvested unless they had been distributed as dividends.
It is not clear whether a distribution with respect to stock by an AFN
having losses would be treated as a dividend for purposes of the
Regulations when all the direct investor's AFNs in the same scheduled
area had net earnings and none of such AFNs declared a dividend. If
the distribution was a dividend, then it reduced the aggregate
reinvested earnings of the direct investor in the area. If the
distribution was not a dividend because, with respect to the
particular AFN, the distribution represented a return of capital, then
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the distribution had to be included in calculating net transfers of
capital. Such various possibilities reduced somewhat the extent to
which the Regulations could be relied upon as a guide to the amount of
reinvested earnings.
The principal difficulty implicit in this definition of
reinvested earnings was the elusive nature of the concept of earnings.
The Regulations were no more vague in setting forth the rules to be
applied in determining earnings than they had to be, considering the
amount of argument such determinations had caused in both the tax and
accounting fields. Essentially, the Regulations provided from the
outset that earnings of AFNs were to be calculated in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, in particular those which
had been used by the direct investor in preparing its reports to
stockholders (14).
So, earnings (or losses) of incorporated affiliates were to be
computed in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted
in the United States and consistently applied (15). U.S. taxes and
foreign dividend withholding taxes were ignored. For the purpose of
determining compliance with schedule area allowables the investor's
share of earnings (and losses) of all incorporated affiliates in that
schedule were combined, excluding from the computation (a) dividends
to those affiliates from other incorporated foreign affiliates of the
investor and (b) earnings of those affiliates from unincorporated
affiliates of the investor in different schedule areas.
To compute reinvested earnings, this combined earnings (or loss)
figure was (a) reduced by the sum of the dividends paid to the direct
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investor by such affiliates and the direct investor's share of the
dividends paid by such affiliates to the investor's affiliates in
other schedule areas, and (b) increased by the sum of the investor's
share of dividends paid to the affiliates in the schedule area in
question by the investor's incorporated affiliates in other schedule
areas and the investor's share of all earnings deemed to be remitted
to the affiliates in the schedule area in question by unincorporated
affiliates in other schedule areas (16). Earnings of unincorporated
affiliates were deemed to be remitted to the extent they exceeded the
affiliate's growth in net assets.
Dividends were calculated before deducting foreign withholding
taxes. They were considered "paid" when entered on the books of the
recipient as paid in cash or subject to payment on demand. There was
a provision for electing to treat dividend paid within sixty days
after the end of the year as having been paid during such year if this
treatment was followed consistently in reporting to OFDI.
For transactions involving incorporated AFNs, the reinvested
earnings component of positive direct investment had to be considered
as well as the net transfer of capital (17). Reinvested earnings were
defined essentially as the direct investor's share of all earnings of
an AFN minus his share of dividends paid. Special computations were
made where incorporated AFN's earnings were attributable to an
incorporated or unincorporated AFN in another scheduled area, or where
dividends were paid to such entities.
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3.2 Investment Allowables
The controls prohibited direct investment during any calendar
year except as generally authorized by the Regulations or specifically
authorized by OFDI upon individual application. The Regulations
authorized unlimited investment in Canada. For the remainder of the
world the direct investor could choose any of three general
authorization limitations, informally described as "allowables" (18):
(a) A worldwide minimum investment allowable of $1,000,000.
(b) A set of "earnings" allowables which are determined
separately for each of three country groups, schedules A, B, and C.
The allowable for each schedule area is an amount equal to thirty
percent of the annual earnings of the direct investor's affiliated
foreign nationals in that schedule area in the preceding year.
(c) A set of "historical" allowables which are determined
separately for the three country groups and are based upon investment
experience there in the 1964-1966 period. Unused earnings and
historical allowables in one schedule could be passed "downstream"
(from C to B or A and from B to A) to other schedules. The historical
allowables could also be passed "upstream" subject to a ceiling equal
to the earnings allowable in the higher schedule. Finally, to the
extent not utilized in the year at all, the historical and earnings
allowables could be carried over to the next year. Some direct
investors had historical allowable carryovers from 1968 which could be
added to 1969 historical or earnings allowables. A supplemental
worldwide "incremental earnings" became available in 1970.
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The worldwide $1,000,000 minimum allowable was substantially more
generous than the comparable 1968 minimum investment authorization,
which was set initially at $1,000,000 and later increased to
$2,000,000. With a single exception, worldwide annual direct
investment (exclusive of Canada) was netted to determine whether the
limitation had been exceeded. The exception was that if the
investor's affiliated foreign nationals (both incorporated and
unincorporated) had an aggregate annual loss, this loss could not be
subtracted in computing whether worldwide investment exceeded the
$1,000,000 limitation.
Since investment was determined after netting out any proceeds of
long-term foreign borrowings expended in or allocated to such
investment, it was possible for firms with substantial foreign
operations as well as medium and small firms to make use of the
minimum allowable. However, if net investment exceeded the $1,000,000
minimum allowable ceiling, the allowable was lost altogether. And, if
the minimum allowable was used but net worldwide investment fell short
of $1,000,000 there was no carryover of unused allowables to later
years. Also, any 1968 historical investment allowable carryovers were
lost if the minimum allowable was used in 1969.
The earnings allowable in each schedule area was an amount equal
to thirty percent of the direct investor's share of the aggregate net
earnings of its affiliated foreign nationals, both incorporated and
unincorporated, in that schedule area in the preceding year. The
election to utilize the earnings allowables had to be made for all
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three schedule areas if made for anyone. However, it was binding
only for the year for which it was made.
The historical investment allowables likewise were separate
investment allowances for each of the three schedule areas which could
be elected annually for the three schedules together. In Schedule A
the allowable was an amount equal to 110 percent of the direct
investor's average 1965-66 annual direct investment in Schedule A. In
Schedule B the allowable was an amount equal to sixty-five percent of
the direct investor's average 1965-66 annual direct investment in
Schedule B. In Schedule C the allowable was the lesser of (a) an
amount equal to thirty-five percent of the direct investor's average
1965-66 annual direct investment in Schedule C or (b) an amount
computed by applying to the direct investor's share of the current
year's earnings of its Schedule C incorporated affiliated foreign
nationals a percentage which was equal to the average percentage of
its share of Schedule C incorporated affiliate earnings which were
reinvested in 1964-66, inclusive.
The earnings or historical allowables could be utilized to cover
any combination of capital transfers and reinvested earnings. Unused
allowables could be passed downstream from Schedule C to Schedule B or
A and from Schedule B to A. Unused historical allowables could be
passed upstream subject to an overall limitation in the upper schedule
equal to what the earnings allowable for the upper schedule would have
been had it been elected. To the extent not so exhausted by the
downstream or upstream shifts, unused earnings or historical
allowables for 1969 or later years could be carried forward to the
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succeeding year within the same schedule area to supplement earnings
or historical allowables in those years. Also, unused 1968 historical
allowables could be used to supplement 1969 earnings allowables in the
same schedule area.
The "incremental earnings allowable" was a supplemental general
investment authorization (19). It was a worldwide investment
authorization in an amount equal to the excess of (a) forty percent of
the difference between the investor's share of the total earnings of
its affiliated foreign nationals (exclusive of Canada) in the current
year and the average (but not less than zero) annual earnings of such
affiliates in 1966-67, over (b) the investor's minimum allowable,
earnings allowables, or historical allowables for the current year,
whichever was highest.
3.3 Repatriation Requirement
In addition to the restrictions on direct investment, the
Regulations required that all direct investors repatriate, by June 30,
1968, so much of their liquid foreign balances as on that date
exceeded the average end-of-month amounts of such balances during 1965
and 1966. After June 30, 1968, the Regulations imposed a continuing
requirement that end-of-month liquid foreign balances be kept at the
1965-66 average. The term "liquid foreign balance" included foreign
bank deposits and short-term financial assets such as negotiable or
readily marketable instruments, and such balances needed to have
nothing to do with the direct investor's direct investments. Indeed,
to the extent that such balances were invested in foreign businesses,
69
they would not be liquid foreign balances of the direct investor (20).
This repatriation provision thus applied only to direct investor's
funds held abroad which were not themselves direct investments. It
should be noted that such funds, as well as funds held abroad by
Americans other than direct investors, could be "long-term" within the
meaning of the Interest Equalization Tax and hence subject to that
tax. However, the Regulations explicitly excluded such long-term
holdings from the provisions dealing with liquid foreign balances;
these provisions applied only to obligations with a period of not more
than one year remaining to maturity when acquired by the direct
investor, or obligations which were redeemable in full at the option
of the investor within one year.
Originally, the Regulations embodied the further requirement that
each American direct investor at least once each year repatriate "to
an account owned by such direct investor denominated in U.S. dollars
at a domestic bank" an amount representing the earnings of AFNs equal
to the same proportion of the earnings of such AFNs attributable to
such direct investor's interest therein as was repatriated during the
three-year period 1966-66, or an amount that would bring direct
investment outflows for the year in line with the direct investment
targets prescribed with respect to the particular scheduled area in
which the AFNs were located. The Regulations required the larger of
the two amounts to be repatriated. Considered together with the
limitations on transfers of capital, the repatriation requirement
meant in Schedules A and B that the direct investor would have to
cause its AFN to declare a dividend, and then send back to the AFN so
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much of the dividend as was permitted as a transfer of capital. In
Schedule C, the repatriation requirement meant that reinvestment of
earnings to an amount not greater than thirty-five percent of the base
period direct investment was actually further limited by the AFN's
average dividend-to-earnings ratio during the three-year base period
governing repatriations. This repatriation scheme was subsequently
revoked with respect to Schedules A and B, though it remained in the
provision governing the Schedule C authorization.
3.31 Foreign Investment Earnings
With respect to Schedule A or B areas, repatriation of earnings
retained by an AFN was not required if the DI's total positive direct
investment did not exceed the general authorization of the
Regulations. The DI's direct investment was, therefore, the algebraic
sum of the net transfer of capital and the reinvested earnings in
AFN's in Schedule A and B countries. A different repatriation
requirement was applicable to Schedule C countries because only
reinvestment of earning was authorized in this area. The net effect
was that reinvestment of earnings could not exceed thirty-five percent
of the average direct investment by the DI in Schedule C AFN's during
1965 and 1966; or the same ratio of the DI's share of earnings in
Schedule C AFN's as was invested during the years 1964-66, whichever
was the lesser. Therefore, a DI with a negative or a zero average
direct investment in a Schedule C area during 1965-66 or with a zero
reinvestment ratio, would not be entitled to reinvest any earnings in
its incorporated Schedule C AFN. Consequently, DIs lacking base
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period status had to repatriate one hundred percent of the earnings of
its AFN or apply for a hardship specific authorization.
The repatriation requirements made it imperative that tax lawyers
and executives coordinate tax planning with the Regulations in order
to avoid unnecessary tax consequences. For example, where reinvested
earnings exceeded the direct investment ceiling for a scheduled area,
the repatriation had to be from the AFN in the country with the
greater potential foreign tax credits, all other factors being equal
(21). In any event, the forced repatriation of earnings was a form of
involuntary conversion that was inconsistent with United States tax
policy. Although a DI could generally determine the form and source
of the repatriation, thus reducing to some extent the tax
consequences, the traditional privilege of a taxpayer to control the
timing of repatriated corporate earnings was preempted.
3.32 Liquid Foreign Balances
The Regulations limited the amount of liquid foreign balances
(other than direct investment liquid foreign balances) that a DI could
hold at the end of any month to the average amount held by the DI at
the end of each month during the base period of 1965 and 1966. The DI
was required to maintain books and records that permitted separation
and identification of all transactions involving the proceeds of
foreign borrowing received and the amount thereof held as foreign
balances, liquid foreign balances, and direct investment foreign
balances. The Regulations further provided that if a DI held a direct
investment liquid foreign balance at the end of the year, he would be
72
prohibited from making any positive direct investment in Schedule A
and B areas. This severe sanction was directed toward DI's who were
retaining the proceeds of long-term foreign borrowings--i.e., direct
investment liquid foreign balances--theoretically in anticipation of
making transfers of capital to AFN's. Because proceeds of borrowings
did not have an adverse effect on United States balance of payments,
the Regulations sought to promote their use as the primary source of
direct investment funds, and the prohibition sanction provided the
incentive to assure compliance by DI's. Nevertheless, these
prohibitions could be avoided by the DI's certifying that had retained
direct investment liquid foreign balance been utilized, it would have
created a substantial probability of material adverse United States or
foreign tax consequences, or would have contravened express
contractual representations or restrictions related to the long-term
foreign borrowing (22). Regardless of the source or amount of liquid
balances retained by a DI, investments of these funds in an AFN were
subject to the restrictions imposed upon the direct investment of
United States-based funds.
Liquid foreign balances were defined to include bank deposits,
negotiable instruments, non-negotiable instruments, commercial paper
and foreign securities. These foreign balances, however, had to be
redeemable at the option of the DI, be readily marketable or
transferable, not be subject to foreign exchange control restrictions,
and not be pledged as security for any borrowing. The "liquid foreign
balances" subject to this month-end limitation consisted of foreign
balances other than (23) (a) foreign balances representing the
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proceeds of long-term foreign borrowings not allocated to direct
investment; (b) Canadian balances; (c) certain nonredeemable,
nontransferable, and nonmarketable foreign securities acquired by the
direct investor before June 30, 1968; (d) bank deposits and foreign
debt securities, with a period of more than one year remaining to
maturity when acquired by the direct investor and not redeemable by
the direct investor within such period; (e) foreign balances subject
to restrictions of a foreign country on liquidation and transfer; and
(f) foreign balances pledged or hypothecated in connection with
borrowings by the direct investor or its affiliated foreign nationals.
And, under certain circumstances, moreover, foreign balances held
by persons other than a direct investor would be deemed "held" by a Dr
(24). If (a) liquid foreign balances held by another "principally
formed or availed of" for such purpose; or (b) held by another (such
as a foreign affiliate of the direct investor), and returnable to the
direct investor on demand without material conditions, and not related
to the business needs of the holder, they were deemed to be held by
the direct investor.
3.4 Foreign Borrowing and Repayment
Direct investment made with the proceeds of "long-term foreign
borrowings" by the direct investor or to which such borrowings are
"allocated" by the direct investor were not counted in determining
whether the investment allowables were exceeded. However, repayments
of such borrowings counted as a form of direct investment subject to
the controls (25). Moreover, in most cases the direct investor had to
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repatriate to the United States by the end of each year all long-term
foreign borrowing proceeds not physically invested at that time.
3.41 Foreign Borrowing
Perhaps the most important means by which a direct investor could
finance expansion abroad and channel funds to AFNs was by long-term
foreign borrowing. The FDIR imposed no restrictions on such
borrowings and, in fact, encouraged it (26). For example:
(a) the proceeds of long-term foreign borrowing invested in AFNs
or allocated as an offset against positive transfers of capital to
AFNs were deducted in calculating net transfers of capital for the
year; the amount of authorized direct investment was not affected to
the extent of such proceeds; or
(b) if the direct investor filed a certificate with the OFDI, his
right to repay the borrowing in future years was preserved, even if
such repayment required the direct investor to exceed his authorized
direct investment.
Since the Regulations provided for the reduction of positive
transfers of capital by the proceeds of long-term foreign borrowing,
the investment of such proceeds did not result in a net transfer of
capital; a net transfer of capital occurred when the borrowing was
repaid. The transfer was then deemed to be a transfer of capital to
the schedule area into which the proceeds of the borrowing were
originally expended or allocated. The scheduled area from which the
funds were borrowed or to which the repayment was made was not
significant.
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3.411 Long-Term Foreign Borrowing
"Long-term foreign borrowing" meant a borrowing by a direct
investor from any foreign national (other than an affiliated foreign
national) with an original maturity of at least 12 months from the
original date of the borrowing (without regard to provisions for
acceleration upon default or provisions contained in convertible debt
instruments which permit conversion within 12 months from the original
date of the borrowing) including, but by no way of limitation, an
extension of credit by any such foreign national to the direct
investor in connection with the purchase of property (including
securities) by the direct investor from such foreign national (27).
For example, a direct investor acquired a business building in France
from a French national. The terms of payment required the immediate
payment of $50,000 in cash, the balance of $500,000 to be paid over a
ten-year period pursuant to a ten-year mortgage. The ten-year
mortgage constituted a long-term foreign borrowing.
With respect to FDIR, a foreign borrowing had to be
"long-term"--that is, with a minimum maturity of 12 months--in order
to be deducted from net transfers of capital. If any payment on the
debt principal was due within 12 months, no part of the borrowing was
considered long-term. Where more than one debt instrument was
involved, however, the direct investor could show that the original
and later payments were made with respect to separate borrowings.
With respect to convertible obligations, the original maturity would
in most cases have to be seven years and, except in a public offering,
the conversion privilege might not be exercisable within three years
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(28). Moreover, to qualify as a long-term foreign borrowing, a
transaction had to satisfy certain conditions. The lender had to be a
foreign national (not an AFN) , and the borrowing had to have an
original maturity date of at least 12 months or be expressly renewable
for a total term of at least 12 months from the original date and not
expected to be repaid, in whole or part, within that period. In
addition, borrowings on or after June 10, 1968, had to satisfy at
least one of four other conditions (29): (a) the borrowing was made
from a foreign bank; (b) the borrowing was from or guaranteed by a
foreign country or agent thereof (but not primarily commercial entity
of a foreign government operating privately within the business
sector); (c) the borrowing had an original maturity of at least three
years and acquisition of the debt obligation by United States
residents or nationals was, under normal circumstances, subject to the
lET; and (d) the lender agreed that for at least three years or until
maturity, whichever occurs first, it would not sell or transfer the
debt obligation to a United States resident or national or to Canada
persons or to anyone whom the lender had reason to believe would do so
(30).
3.412 Dates in Determining if Borrowing is Long-Term
There were three significant dates to be considered by direct
investors when examining prior as well as future borrowing (31).
(a) Borrowing prior to January 1, 1968, was considered to be
long-term if it had an original maturity of 12 months or more and no
payments or principal were made during the l2-month period.
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(b) Borrowing on or after January 1, 1968, was considered to be
long-term if the conditions set forth in (a), above, were met or if
there were express provisions for renewal, extension or continuance
for at least 12 months and the direct investor did not reasonably
expect to make any payments of principal within that l2-month period.
(c) Borrowings on or after June 10, 1968 (which would be of most
interest to direct investors) was considered to be long-term if in
addition to the conditions set forth in (b) above, one or more of the
following conditions was satisfied:
(1) The lender was a foreign bank.
(2) The lender or guarantor was a foreign country or agency
thereof.
(3) The borrowing had an original maturity of three years or
more and results in the payment of interest equalization tax by the
direct investor (unless such payment is exempt or excluded from tax
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and such exemption
or exclusion was not foreseeable when the borrowing was made).
(4) The lender agreed in writing not to sell or transfer the
debt obligation (resulting from the borrowing) to a resident or
national of the U.S. other than a domestic bank, a Canadian person or
to any person whom the lender had reason to believe would sell or
transfer such obligation to such persons.
For example: On December 1, 1968, U.S. corporation A acquired 100% of
the outstanding stock of a Schedule B corporation for $1,000,000. The
contract called for an immediate payment of $100,000 in cash with the
balance payable January 1, 1972 (i.e., more than three years later).
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Although the U.S. corporation had made a transfer of capital of
$1,000,000, the $900,000 balance not due until January 1, 1972
constituted a long-term foreign borrowing and, therefore, reduced the
transfer of capital in the year of acquisition to $100,000. When the
balance was paid, the payment would constitute a $900,000 transfer of
capital to the Schedule B area.
3.413 Refinancing
The direct investors could refinance a long-term borrowing by
renewal or extension of the term of the borrowing, or by a new
borrowing from the same or another lender. This did not constitute a
repayment of the original borrowing or the making of a new borrowing.
For example: (a) Direct investor originally borrowed $1,000,000 on a
long-term basis from Bank A. Prior to the date the loan became due
for payment, the direct investor renewed the loan for an additional 12
months. This renewal did not constitute a repayment of the loan. (b)
A direct investor borrowed $1,000,000 from Foreign Bank A on a
long-term basis. Subsequently, the direct investor enters into a new
long-term borrowing agreement with Bank A to borrow an additional
$3,000,000. The direct investor uses $1,000,000 of the $3,000,000
proceeds to liquidate the previous loan. The liquidation of the first
loan does not constitute a repayment of that loan. Thus, the direct
investor is deemed to have a new long-term borrowing of $2,000,000.
It is evident that the direct investor receiving a specific
authorization to make transfers of capital on condition that he
refinance his obligation abroad within a specified period was only
~
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being authorized specifically to do what the Regulations provided
generally that he might do. However, early amendments to the
Regulations established the rule that a transfer of capital could not
be offset against foreign borrowings made after the date of the
transfer unless made within ninety days before the borrowing and in
the same year and "as part of one transaction or a group of integrated
transactions" (32). Inasmuch as direct investors with specific
authorizations conditioned on "mandatory refinancing" were given an
extended period of time within which to refinance--often as much as to
the end of 1968--a specific authorization so conditioned did have the
function of waiving the ninety days requirement during the period that
it remained in the Regulations.
3.414 Short-Term Foreign Borrowing
Short-term foreign borrowing was less than 12 months (33). If a
short-term borrowing was executed prior to January 1, 1968, and the
proceeds were invested during 1967, the repayment constituted a
transfer of capital. A short-term foreign borrowing after January 1,
1968, constituted a transfer of capital at the date the proceeds were
invested in an AFN.
3.42 Repayment
The FDIR provided that a direct investor's repayment of long-term
foreign borrowing would be treated as a transfer of capital by the
direct investor. The repayment of short-term borrowings was treated
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as a transfer of capital only if the proceeds of such borrowings were
expended in making transfers of capital in 1967 (34).
Although a repayment of long-term foreign borrowings, in most
cases, would constitute a positive transfer of capital and would
reduce the amount of direct investment allowable in a particular
scheduled area, the repayment by the direct investor of certain
borrowings, including borrowings of an AFN, was authorized without
limitation. Such repayments included the following (35):
(a) The repayment of a borrowing obtained by the direct investor
was authorized without limitation if the borrowing was a long-term
foreign borrowing,
(1) obtained before January 1, 1968, the proceeds of which
were transferred or allocated in making transfers of capital to AFNs
on or after January 1, 1965. The repayment of a long-term foreign
borrowing during the current reporting period would not constitute a
transfer of capital if the proceeds of such borrowing were invested in
an AFN prior to January 1, 1965.
(2) obtained on or after January 1, 1968, but before June
10, 1968, provided that a certificate was filed pursuant to such
borrowing.
(3) obtained on or after June 10, 1968, provided that a
certificate is filed.
(4) obtained by issuing convertible debt obligations of the
direct investor (issuance of stock upon conversion constitutes
repayment). However, such conversion will be deemed to be a transfer
of capital in the year following the year in which the conversion
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takes place, i.e., the amount of the transfer will not reduce the
direct investor's authorized direct investment until the following
year.
(b) The repayment by the direct investor of a borrowing obtained
by an AFN of that direct investor would be authorized without
limitation if the borrowing was
(1) obtained from a bank or guaranteed by the direct
investor prior to January 1, 1968, or
(2) obtained from a bank on or after January 1, 1968,
pursuant to a fixed loan commitment or line of credit (or renewal or
extension thereof) established before January 1, 1968, or
(3) guaranteed by the direct investor on or after January
1, 1968, provided that a certificate was filed by the direct investor,
or
(4) obtained by issuing debt obligations of the AFN
convertible into stock of the direct investor (issuance of stock upon
conversion constitutes repayment).
In addition, a transfer to an AFN by the direct investor pursuant to a
guarantee to enable the AFN to repay its own borrowings was generally
authorized, provided that a certificate was filed by the direct
investor.
3.421 Filing a Certificate
Prior to making a foreign borrowing or a guarantee of a borrowing
by an AFN, the DI had to satisfy the certification provisions of the
FDIR. A certificate had to be delivered to the Secretary of Commerce
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attesting that the DI believed, on the basis of the then existing
facts and circumstances, that he (a) would not make any transfers of
capital in connection with the repayment of the borrowing within seven
years or (b) would make transfers of capital within the seven-year
period, but also had grounds to believe that these transfers would be
within the general authorizations (36). And, the certificate had to
contain the amount borrowed or guaranteed; the principal amount due
each year; and, the name of the lender or underwriter in the case of a
public offering (37).
To prevent the flow back into the United States of debt
obligations resulting from foreign borrowings, certain conditions had
to be met in order for a borrowing to be deemed a "long-term foreign
borrowing" (38). If the borrowing was not from a foreign bank or
guaranteed by a foreign nation, to qualify as a long-term foreign
borrowing it had to have at least a three-year maturity date or be
subject to the Interest Equalization Tax. Otherwise, the lender had
to sign an agreement that he would not sell the debt obligation to
Canadian citizens or to residents or nationals of the United States
for a period of three years or until final maturity, whichever
occurred first.
Accordingly, the direct investor could give the required
certification if it either could extend at its option or had an
assurance that the original or another bank would favorably consider a
request prior to the original maturity to refinance the loan to the
seven-year maturity, barring an adverse change in the direct
investor's business and financial condition (39).
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3.422 Possible Pitfalls
Although long-term financial borrowing provided many of the
answers to financing foreign operations, there were certain pitfalls a
direct investor had to keep in mind (40). The absence of base-period
experience could mean that the direct investor would be required to
repatriate all of the earnings of the AFNs in excess of the $200,000
allowable, unless negative transfers of capital could be created to
offset current earnings. As a result of having to repatriate all of
the earnings of AFNs and not being able to make net positive transfer
of capital, the direct investor might not be able to repay the loan
without violating the Regulations.
If the direct investor did have base-period allowables, it was
important to review the possibility of using excess allowables in one
scheduled area to repay loans in other schedule areas. Such excess
could only be carried downstream, i.e., from area C to A or B or from
area B to A.
A direct investor considering guaranteeing the borrowing of an
AFN had to again consider base-period experience in that schedule
area, since the AFN would have to repay such borrowing out of earnings
allowed to be reinvested.
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CHAPTER IV
ASSESSING THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CONTROLS
The obvious objective of foreign direct investment controls is a
reduction of foreign investment outlays so as to improve international
payments. This objective should be pursued in accordance with two
general guidelines (1): one is the equitable treatment of
capital-exporting companies covered by the controls, and the other is
avoidance of unnecessary interference in business practice. The U.S.
Foreign Direct Investment Program performed two undeniable services.
First, the Regulations created a vastly increased awareness of the
balance of payments problem, particularly in the business community.
Corporate executives were forced to consider the impact of their
transactions in balance of payment terms. In the process of adapting
to the Regulations they learned the techniques for minimizing the
adverse impact of their foreign transactions. It was conceived as a
temporary measure to achieve a reduction in the United States balance
of payments deficit of $1.0 billion in 1968 from the 1967 level of
over $3.5 billion (2). Unquestionably, the program had a substantial
immediate impact upon the United States balance of payments,
particularly in light of the prohibition against new direct
investments in Europe--the primary area of American foreign
investment. The validity of this prediction became apparent: the
second-quarter results for 1968 showed a payments deficit of only $170
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million. The second benefit was the knowledge gained by the
administrators of the Program. At the beginning of the effort, the
accounting techniques employed to adjust international monetary
reserves had never been matched with the commercial transactions they
were supposed to represent. The Program fostered added insight into
this correlation and, as a result, gave additional meaning to the
balance of payments statistics. This knowledge was a cornerstone of a
better and more permanent solution to the balance of payments problem
(3) •
Removal of the controls was said by the United States government
officials to be feasible only when the dollar was strong enough to
bear the burden imposed on foreign investment. Since no measures
quickly became apparent to balance international payments, the end of
the "temporary" controls did not appear as quickly as initially
expected. President Nixon, however, had pledged in his campaign to
reduce the stringency of the controls, and in July 1969, OFDI
announced a series of changes--retroactive to January 1, 1969--easing
the controls. The minimum investment that can be made outside of
quota restrictions was raised from $200,000 to $1 million, thus easing
the controls for over 2500 of the 3200 companies reporting
investments; this amount could also be invested in any of all of the
three scheduled areas. All companies were also permitted to choose an
optional quota of thirty percent of their 1968 earnings of foreign
affiliates; this eased the limitation for some and permitted a
reallocation of quotas among the three schedule areas. In addition,
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measures were adopted to ease the burden on airlines which had planned
to invest in new jumbo jets.
The Department of Commerce of the United States indicated that it
anticipated a substantial payments deficit in 1969 (4). It did not
consider that the removing of investment controls would reduce the
deficit. There was another justification for removing the controls,
however, namely substantial evidence that they were worsening the
deficit. Some evidence to this effect was apparent from an
examination of the effects of the controls on total investment
outlays, on foreign borrowing and the circular flow of funds, on
exports and statutory authority.
4.1 Effects on Total Investment Abroad
To begin with, at least the ostensible purpose of the investment
controls, as OFDI had emphasized again and again, is not to restrict
expansion of investment--only to shift its financing from domestic
sources to foreign sources. Moreover, while "direct investment" was
reduced $2.2 billion in 1968 (from $3.7 to $1.5 billion), the U.s.
government claimed that overall investment, including that financed by
foreign borrowings, had not only been largely unaffected by the
Regulations but had in fact increased (5). Companies were able to
obtain foreign financing with little difficult and the cost
differential of borrowing on foreign capital markets, which is slight
largely because there is no "compensating balance rule," does not
affect the decision to invest.
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The principal damage to payments arises if total foreign outlays
are reduced--as a result of the controls--below what they otherwise
would have been. In this instance, there is an absolute loss to
payments, after the recoupment period, compared to what would have
been gained through the investment. Although one cannot know what
would have been the situation apart from the controls, the rate of
increase of expenditures on plant and equipment abroad declined during
1967-68--i.e., during the period of imposition of guidelines and
controls--with that in manufacturing expected to level off in 1968 and
with 1969 expected to show no increases in annual outlays. This is
the one potential consequence of controls that should have been
avoided.
But rather than avoid a reduction of foreign investment projects,
the United States Department of Commerce--in the voluntary
program--urged the dropping or delay of marginal projects. The
Department of Commerce reported that many companies had agreed to
delay or cut off such projects. And, companies desiring to invest
abroad for the first time were discouraged from investigating
potential opportunities.
Whether or not as a direct result of the controls, annual outlays
abroad had increased much more slowly than formerly. The most data on
expenditures abroad indicated that investments in plant and equipment
abroad rose three percent in 1968 over 1967. But these levels of
increase were substantially lower than the twenty percent average
annual increase in the year 1964-1966. And there was a close
correlation in the drop-off with the stringency of controls (6).
l
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Some provisions of the controls directly tended to decrease the
level of new investment abroad, for example (7), the requirement that
repayment of foreign borrowings be counted in the quota. A reduction
occurs because the parent is faced with a decision to draw on its
present annual quota plus some of its future quota in the form of
foreign borrowing. Its future quota for net new investment will be
smaller. Thus, to borrow abroad, it must have a high premium factor
for present investment as compared to future investment.
Another adverse effect on investment outlays arises in the
differential treatment of uses of funds held abroad. If the parent
places $1 million in a foreign bank to backstop a loan of the same
amount to an affiliate by the bank, the amount pledged is counted as a
capital transfer (8). But had the same amount already been on deposit
in the foreign bank, and was later required to be held there to
backstop a loan, it is not counted as a transfer. Conversely, had the
parent withdrawn its deposit abroad and loaned the $1 million directly
to the affiliate, a transfer of capital occurs and is debited against
parent's quota despite the fact that the funds never flowed through
U.S. payments.
A final provision which reduces the volume of funds available to
the parent for investment is that relating to repatriation of foreign
earnings (9). The necessity to return earnings obviously cuts the
available funds abroad, but that is the intent, since the remission
helps the U.S. balance of payments. But there is an additional
reduction of available funds which does not pass into the credit side
of U.S. payments arising from the necessity of the affiliate to pay to
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foreign governments a withholding tax on dividends sent to the parent.
This tax would otherwise not have been paid, and it is an additional
burden on earnings of the affiliate that does not help the U.S.
payments position. Some companies had to borrow funds to meet the
repatriation requirements, thus cutting into their ability to expand
investment abroad out of foreign borrowings.
4.2 Circular Flow
The principal danger posed by the Regulations was the reduction
of future inflow of capital from foreign investments. The return of
income from past foreign investments has consistently been a positive
contributor to United States balance of payments to the extent of
nearly $2.0 billion a year (10). The U.S. government's position has
been that this inflow of capital will continue even without additional
foreign investment; moreover, an increase in net income is actually
predicted because of greater operating efficiencies and lower
expenses.
An analysis of the returns to the U.S. balance of payments from
foreign direct investment outlays indicated that, on the average,
there had been a prompt recoupment of dollar outflows through
earnings, sales of capital equipment, and concomitant exports (11).
If dollar outflows are recouped in a short time, every effort should
be made by the control authorities not to reduce foreign investment
but to substitute foreign borrowings for dollars outflows and to
expand the return of earnings, while permitting sufficient new
outflows of equity or parent funds to expand total outlays as much as
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possible. OFDI objectives, therefore, should not be to interfere with
private decision to expand investment abroad but merely to encourage
or require a substitution of foreign borrowing for dollar outflow and
retained earnings. If the controls have any other effect, they are
likely to affect the payment situation adversely by reducing total
returns and lengthening the recoupment period.
Many arguments had been put forth as to the effect--harmful or
beneficial--of the OFDI program upon the United States economy. Among
the most frequently heard was that restrictions on direct investment
were, in fact, harmful to the U.S. balance of payments accounts (12).
Investment outflow was returned almost twice over every year in
earnings. Between 1950 and 1967, $69.5 billion flowed into the United
States as earnings, as opposed to a total dollar outflow for
investment of $33 billion. Thus, restriction of investment expansion,
so the argument ran, would result in a reduction of U.S. future
earnings capacity and, therefore, harm the U.S. future balance of
payments position. Such control, it is said, hurt the U.S.
competitive position in the world marketplace because investment
opportunities are lost to other countries which are never regained or,
if they are, only at substantial cost and difficulty. And lost to the
DI as funds for further investment are foreign earnings repatriated to
the United States because in excess of authorized allowables. In
subtle as well as in obvious ways, then, the mandatory direct
investment controls are seen as striking a hard blow to the most
important plus factor in U.S. balance of payments accounts.
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Moreover, by encouraging foreign financing of direct investment,
it was also argued that the program created a considerable debt
overhang which someday would have to be paid off at considerable cost
to u.s. payments position (13). Furthermore, the necessity to obtain
foreign financing forced many to borrow who had funds of their own
available. Foreign financing sought in foreign capital markets often
was not available to small and medium-sized investors or was more
costly than funds obtained from United States sources.
4.3 Effects on Exports
Critics of the program argued that direct investment controls
result in a reduction of u.s. exports. Since in the late 60s, 25
percent of u.s. exports were goods shipped to foreign subsidiaries and
affiliates, direct investment abroad was obviously a major determinant
of the level of u.s. exports (14). Moreover, U.S. traditional trade
surplus plunged dramatically from $3.5 billion in 1967 to $100 million
in 1968--a loss of $3.4 billion, and it has been suggested that the
investment controls were responsible for that deterioration. It
should also be noted that possible retaliations by foreign countries
might have a further adverse effect upon American exports.
The justification is that the investor could have borrowed the
funds abroad and purchased the U.S. equipment, raising the credits for
exports. But this action on the part of the investor would actually
reduce the volume of credit available to him and would cut the level
of total investment outlays. Since there is a full recoupment and
since a dollar contribution is often needed to bring forth local
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funds, such investment should be readily allowed--outside of any quota
of capital outflows. Equally, any capital outflows which can be shown
to finance an equal amount of capital equipment sales should be
exempted from the control quotas. Without such an exemption, a
premium is placed on buying the equipment abroad because of the
supplier credits obtained from the seller--which adds to the foreign
borrowing and does not count against the dollar quota until repaid.
The rationalization of the control authorities that funds could be
borrowed abroad and spent for U.S. capital equipment is undercut by
commercial practice. This practice alters the capital equipment
investment outlay relationship and extends the recoupment period.
And, the control over intercompany financing of exports reduced
the benefits of investment by altering trade relationships. A U.S.
parent cannot increase its credits to an affiliate to finance exports
to it without having this charged to his quota of permissible dollar
outflows. But these credits provided an immediate export of goods--a
100 percent offset. Safeguards would be necessary to prevent these
credits from becoming long-term contributions to affiliate capital,
but the inclusion of increases in such loans in permissible quotas
reduces the possible dollar contribution to equity and reduces the
available local financing. If the U.S. investor chooses to use his
quota to support local borrowing, he cuts the trade effect and extends
the recoupment period, partly offsetting the effect of the local
borrowings (15).
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4.4 Removing the Controls
In view of statutory authority, unlike most major monetary
programs, the Foreign Direct Investment Program was a product solely
of the Executive Branch. While Congressional concern over the
advisability of the Program was expressed, Congress had no role in its
promulgation and doubt has been expressed as to whether the
Regulations were authorized by the trading with the Enemy Act of U.S.
(16). This Act, passed by Congress in October 1917, originally
delegated to the President broad discretionary authority under section
5(b) to regulate commercial transactions between United States
nationals and the nationals of any foreign country, whether enemy,
ally, or otherwise, while the United States was at war (17). So, the
statutory authority for the imposition of direct investment controls
must rest upon the declaration of a national emergency by the
President (18). In fact, the President's executive order relied
specifically for authority upon a statutory provision giving the
President broad powers to regulate transactions in foreign exchange or
property during any "period of national emergency declared by the
President" (19). The most expansive aspect of the presidential power
under this provision is the virtually unlimited authority to designate
a period of national emergency. In promulgating the executive order
which established the Foreign Direct Investment Program, President
Johnson continued the national emergency proclaimed by President
Truman and reaffirmed by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. The
determination of a national emergency is "so peculiarly within the
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province of the chief executive" that it is not readily susceptible to
judicial review (20). Although the Nixon Administration was committed
to removal of the mandatory controls on foreign direct investment, it
recognized that this removal must be accompanied by improvement in the
fundamental economic problems which created a persistent imbalance in
the nation's balance of payments and provoked the dollar confidence
crisis late in 1967 which led to the institution of the controls (21).
The breadth of the President's authority stems not only from the
patently broad language of the statute but also from the history of
the statute's use under the past four presidents. Precedents
involving its use fall into two distinct categories. Executive
measures in the first category deal with the regulation of gold and
silver in domestic financial crises, while the second category
includes order prohibiting substantially all commercial transactions
with enemy countries or territories during periods of war or
diplomatic stress. When placed in this context, the order clearly
represented an expansion of presidential power. While it was a
domestic financial measure, designed to strengthen the dollar, it went
far beyond the handling of currency. It restricted transfers of all
kinds of property and required the repatriation of property located
abroad.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis, however, is not
that the order was ultra vires. Instead, it may be viewed as a hybrid
of the two categories and a reasonable extension of each of them. The
order was war-related because of the nature of the national emergency
upon which the President founded his exercise of authority and because
.J
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of the close relationship between the current balance of payments
problem and the Vietnam War. At the same time, the order was partly
within the domestic monetary category because continued deficits would
impair the stability of the dollar. Since the order was logically
related to previous precedents and because of the expansive nature of
the statutory authorization, it was unlikely that the Program could be
judicially upset for lack of authority, particularly in view of
congressional acquiescence (22).
On the other hand, the United States used restrictions on the
outflow of capital for the purpose of correcting the deficit in the
U.S. payments balance. Clearly such restrictions violate the
principle of freedom for international commerce--including
investment--on which U.S. international economic policies are
generally based (23). Furthermore, the Regulations could be viewed as
depriving a Dr or AFN of property without due process of law or
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment (24). A
Dr, for example, could incur considerable tax costs in repatriating
money or property held in foreign countries, or be put to unnecessary
expense in obtaining foreign financing for investments which could
have been financed with the investor's own funds without the interest
expense. More broadly, there is the possibility that foreign
investment is such a primary activity that any serious curtailment of
it deprives an investor of the use and enjoyment of his property. The
Fifth Amendment, moreover, speaks in terms of "deprivation" which is a
much broader category than that of a taking or confiscation. Where
the delegation of authority to the president is questionable, or there
JJ)
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is potential abuse of that authority, this problem becomes especially
acute. The Regulations however in permitting investment abroad
according to historical base period levels of investment, merely
regulated the rate of increase in an investor's overseas transfer of
capital. A Dr was never denied the use of his money to make
investments; indeed, the Regulations provided him with an array of
options to maximize his opportunities to invest abroad while still
furthering the balance of payments objectives of the OFDr program.
And, compliance with the repatriation requirements, moreover, could
bring the Dr into conflict with certain foreign corporation laws,
especially in Europe where the heaviest concentration of United States
foreign investment was located and where the Regulations were
strictest in regard to increased investment. A decision by a Dr not
to reinvest the earnings of its AFNs would raise the important issue
of "whether and to what extent the DI, in complying with the
Regulations, could cause the board or the shareholder's meeting of the
European subsidiary to determine its reinvestment policy according to
the DI's repatriation obligation rather than according to their best
business judgment as required under European corporation law. One
could argue that causing the payment of dividends by the AFN, where
the reinvestment or retention of earnings would be a clearly
appropriate internal business decision, violated the fiduciary
obligation of the Dr as a member of management or as a controlling
shareholder to act in the corporate interest and to protect the
interest of minority shareholders (25).
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Measures had to be developed for preventing a rush of U.S.
dollars to payoff foreign borrowing before it became due and normally
to prevent a flood of dollars eager to escape possible future controls
(26). This was accomplished by phasing out the repayment of foreign
borrowing according to a pre-arranged schedule or encouraging a
roll-over of debt. In light of all of these infirmities, the Office
of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI) announced January 29, 1974, that
the Secretary by Executive Order 11387 and otherwise by law, the
Foreign Direct Investment Regulations contained in Title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations, Chapter X, Part 1000, was revoked (27). Such
revocation did not, however, affect their force or validity or the
responsibilities of any person thereunder while in effect, or their
continued enforcement (28).
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TCHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This thesis has explored the importance of foreign direct
investment; the support structure and impetus for United States
foreign investment; the related involvement of the United States
government and foreign governments; the impact of foreign direct
investment on national balance of payments; and the foreign direct
investment program of the United States. To summarize, U.S. foreign
direct investment is a debit item in determining the balance of
payments, but is also a major factor in the economic growth of the
world. It has made available to other nations needed dollars,
advanced technology and managerial skills. However, during the late
1960's U.S. foreign direct investment became a major national economic
policy issue, not as a result of balancing welfare benefits and costs
as it should have, but as the consequence of a narrower focus on the
choice of particular means to reduce the deficit. The Foreign Direct
Investment Regulations (FDIR) were designed to curtail the outflow of
dollars from the United States and to encourage the repatriation of
earnings from previous outflow. Viewed in the most favorable light,
the FDIR resulted in an improvement in the United States balance of
payments position. At worst, the Regulations led to a reduction of
capital inflow to the extent that the payments deficit was corrected
only by devaluing the dollar.
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The history of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Regulations
suggests that the decision to control foreign direct investment should
focus mainly on two issues. First, in light of the nation's political
and commercial relations with other countries, what is the total
welfare gain from foreign direct investment and its distribution
between the home and host markets. Second, what imperatives for
action are dictated by the country's balance of payments position.
Appropriate weighing of these issues necessitates sensitivity to
both private sector and public sector realities. Companies invest
abroad in the first place because the size of the market or source of
supply indicates that an investment will be profitable. In
considering the profitability, most companies do not require a larger
profit than can be obtained through a similar investment in the United
States. In a large number of instances, companies have invested in a
foreign country initially as a result of steps taken by the foreign
government making it difficult to serve the market any longer through
export from the United States. Unless the market or source of supply
is believed to be suitable for foreign investment, no action by
foreign governments will induce United States companies to invest in a
particular country. The equally important public sector reality is
that responsible sharing of a country's progress and technical
advances with other countries is a critical touchstone for promotion
of human welfare and economic progress at home and abroad. Therefore,
the decision to impose foreign direct investment controls should
clearly delineate whether such controls are only temporary to handle
~\
J
short-term balance of payments problems or are logical, long-term
measures to achieve legitimate development objectives.
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